A20 – Ethnic sub-identity is the basis for national turmoil/division.

Ye Qiquan believes that the risk to China’s unification does not lie in the Asian alliance of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Europe is the biggest variable in China’s unification process. Furthermore, whether or not Europe participates in wars in Asia also significantly impacts its prospects.

A political assumption is that the old imperial order, dominated by the United States, relied on four main pillars of power: the North American pillar, the European pillar, the East Asian pillar, and the Israeli pillar. In China’s construction of its imperial structure, the East Asian pillar of the United States is the first to be impacted. The United States must first assess this reality and formulate the best response plan. China has reached a historical juncture in building its imperial structure. Closing its security gaps in the East is crucial to the speed and success of its imperial construction. Its focus is not only on East Asia but also inevitably includes the security of Southeast Asia, the Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean passage. The competition between these two established players and newcomers dominates the process of building a new order in East Asia. However, Russia is not inactive. It may become a key third party, reaping significant unexpected gains in balancing European actions.

The US victory began even before the Sino-US summit. Ye Qiquan’s prediction a month in advance was validated by this meeting. The summit was scheduled for May 13-15, 2026, but Chinese state media, in their pre-summit propaganda on the 12th and 13th, proactively pledged “mutual support and common prosperity,” aiming to “lay a more solid foundation for Sino-US relations.” During the subsequent meeting, Chinese leaders publicly promised the US “not to initiate unification” in an attempt to secure political protection from the US government for their “uncertain future.”

On July 1, 2025, China announced a transfer of its “final political decision-making power.” This transfer of political power actually occurred before the announcement date. However, the announcement date is a crucial marker of the formal operation of the new political power execution process. Therefore, it is reasonable to name this “unconventional transfer of political power” the “July 1st mechanism.” The reasons for the “July 1st mechanism” may be very complex and difficult to trace clearly, but Xi Jinping’s breach of his political promise to “unify the country during his term” is likely a significant factor. Other contributing factors may involve his conflicts with the military and with other political families in China.

China’s moderate elites completely subscribe to Western assessment systems when evaluating the nation’s overall strength, overall war capability, and overall competitiveness. This leads them to unanimously oppose China’s plan to unify Taiwan by force. Their opposition is based on their fears, primarily embodied in the following pillars. However, Ye Qiquan’s views are completely opposite. Ye Qiquan believes that China’s overall national war capability will have surpassed that of the United States by 2022; Japan and South Korea, while initially inevitable participants in a Sino-US war, will inevitably join China’s camp in the later stages; forceful unification is a shortcut to rapidly establishing a new East Asian order; the new East Asian order is the cornerstone of the Sino-Asian empire; the new East Asian order is the cornerstone that forces the United States to choose the “North American-East Asian axis”; the establishment of the next generation of world order will inevitably involve a period of chaos; the Taiwan base, the new East Asian order, and China’s forceful unification action are key to shortening this period of chaos; compared to other options, the “North American-East Asian axis” is more readily accepted by the Americans.

Beyond the “effective range” advantage of China’s strategic weapons, its operational-level weapons also possess a reliable “effective range” advantage compared to the United States. This gives China a de facto battlefield advantage in all levels of conventional warfare. This advantage is overwhelming, especially when China pursues a “defensive-offensive strategy.” [Note 2: Even with China’s substantial investment in developing its aircraft carrier battle groups, their role in a Sino-US conflict in East Asia will primarily manifest as battlefield isolation or theater deterrence. In a “defensive theater” in East Asia, China’s winning force will be theater-wide medium-range missiles. In an “offensive theater” in Taiwan, China’s winning force will be short-range missiles, battlefield drones, and battlefield robots. In a “defensive theater” targeting Europe’s overall involvement in the East Asian theater, China’s winning weapon is the strategy of “creating chaos in Europe and defeating the enemy outside the defensive zone.” The real bottom line ensuring China’s survival is possessing 3,500 nuclear warheads and demonstrating to the people of North America and Europe its resolve to use them.] This is China’s ability to “preemptively eliminate the option of nuclear war”.