This is a collection of uncategorized articles, published in September 2026. However, they are essentially older pieces; they were originally attachments to a mass email. For various reasons, they weren’t thoroughly organized and were temporarily compiled into a single collection, published simultaneously on the blog and EDD.
The following is the table of contents for this collection of articles.
This is the content of an internal email.
Chinese politicians often avoid mentioning the empire and refrain from considering social and economic issues from an imperial perspective. However , the imperial path is the only way to solve China’s practical problems, especially those based on economics, costs, normal profit margins, supporting the people, reducing public resentment, resisting external plunder, and opposing authoritarian exploitation. Before establishing a power structure (the outward framework of an empire), any “shortcut” is unsustainable and unsustainable . This is because the power to set rules is in the hands of others; the strongest capital forces do not support you (capital must exist within a power framework, with politics and capital forming a dual authority); and the power to adjudicate economic matters is in the hands of others. You may work hard for 10 years, but someone can easily steal your profits by changing the rules. With a little instigation, outsiders can plunder your interests. With a little provocation, your former friends can demand exorbitant prices. If you try to govern through finance, capital will inevitably strip you of your independent decision-making power. If you try to introduce easily controllable, scattered foreign capital, it will inevitably affect your organizational capabilities and domestic stability. If you only cultivate the imperial core with “internal friction costs,” the imperial core cannot develop in the long term and will inevitably shrink. Without the “external framework of the empire” to support the “imperial core,” the imperial core cannot be maintained normally at all.
Note 1: This is the content of an internal email. Note 2: “Mao Shen” is a term used internally. It refers to Mao Zedong.
Note 3: “Chang Kai-shen” is a specially designated internal term. It has two meanings: First, it refers to the political figure Chiang Kai-shek. Second, it is specifically used to ridicule a group of high-ranking, academically incompetent individuals who occupy the highest academic positions in the country.
The “New Order” from a Chinese Perspective
Ye Qiquan
qiquanye@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-4286-9746
Thursday, October 23, 2025
summary:
Why does China employ a “destructive strategy” to gain (seize) economic benefits? Will this “destructive strategy” result in a win-win situation or a total loss? Understanding this issue from the perspective of imperial power and imperial order is a crucial approach. Imperial power and imperial order are closely intertwined not only with China’s current problems but also with universal global issues. China already possesses a complete imperial core. Now is the historical opportune moment to construct China’s outward imperial framework. The imperial core is the foundation for building the outward imperial framework, and the outward imperial framework is essential for maintaining the vitality of the imperial core. Currently, China is in a historical window of opportunity to build its outward imperial framework. Missing this window could plunge China into another 200-year period of economic colonization. For the United States, there are multiple options for rebuilding the imperial order. These include rebuilding the North American-European axis, establishing a new North American-European-Russian axis, jointly building a North American-China axis, or retreating to the Americas to exercise the functions of a land-based empire. The North American – China axis is not a priority for the United States. However, China’s priority is forcing the United States to choose this option. Moreover, this priority is substantially beneficial to the long-term interests of the United States, which is the underlying logic behind the United States’ ultimate choice of this option.
Discussion and Summary
The plant-based (productive/endogenous) wealth path focuses on creating wealth through the production process. This path is stable and sustainable, but suffers from high costs and limited efficiency. The animal-based (predatory/exogenous) wealth path focuses on acquiring external wealth. This path is risky and unsustainable. However, the animal-based wealth path is the most efficient way to acquire wealth. Through long-term introspection and self-effort, China has established a powerful “imperial core.” If it does not seize the historical opportunity to establish an external imperial framework to protect this core, China’s imperial core cannot maintain its long-term vitality. If China fails to seize the opportunity to establish a solid external imperial framework, it is essentially handing over the fate of the nation to outsiders, handing the knife that determines the fate of the nation to others. In other words, it is actively making others its prey. A significant factor contributing to the rapid accumulation of public discontent in China in recent years (to find an excuse) is the sluggish growth of endogenous wealth, the depletion of external wealth sources, the pursuit of wealth by secondary power levels, the loss of hope for advancement among the grassroots, the increased demand for wealth redistribution, and the lack of effective wealth redistribution solutions. The grievances accumulated among ordinary Chinese citizens have nearly coalesced into a significant political force. Even a powerful figure like the King of Thailand…
Even the military, with its legally granted superpowers, cannot effectively suppress or destroy the Thaksin family organization and utilize Thai civilian power. China’s heroic families should face this reality and risk. Like the crisis in the United States, only by opening up new tax sources and discovering new wealth creation schemes can the problem be fundamentally solved. Furthermore, finding an outlet for public grievances is also an effective short-term solution to relieve pressure. Unifying Taiwan is not only a short-term solution to relieve pressure, but also a medium-term solution to open up new tax sources, and a long-term solution to building the outward framework of China’s empire. In other words, unifying Taiwan is the golden key to solving all kinds of domestic problems in China!
There may be various opinions or plans regarding the timing of Taiwan’s reunification. From Yeh Chi-chuan’s perspective, 2026 is the best window of opportunity. He believes 2026 has a series of advantages: A) While American reformists are working to de-escalate the war in Ukraine, the war between Europe and Russia cannot be effectively de-escalated, ceasefired, or ended. B) Even if the US works to promote a ceasefire, it will not be able to gather enough political resources to pacify Russia before the end of 2026. C) Before the end of 2026, the US will certainly not be able to overcome its current fiscal and economic crisis, and therefore will not be able to effectively rebuild the “North American-European power axis,” let alone establish a new “North American-European-Russian power axis.”
Based on China’s political cycle, 2027 is practically a difficult year to initiate military action. Even if a unified operation is launched in 2028 or 2029, and the US hasn’t fully overcome its fiscal and economic crises, China will face the following dilemmas: A. De-escalation of hostility between Europe and Russia will diminish China’s political advantage over Europe. B. A decrease in the intensity of the conflict in Ukraine will allow the US, Europe, and Russia to use the guise of negotiating a “US-Europe-Russia” cooperation plan to extract high prices from China. C. Once China’s political advantage over Europe diminishes, regardless of whether Russia or China initiates the proposal to enhance cooperation, China’s gains will inevitably shrink while its costs will inevitably increase. D. Russia will never abandon its pursuit of “European identity,” and any move by Europeans to beckon to Russians can offset China’s massive political investment. E. Whether European or Russian, given equal costs or similar benefits, their instinct is to align themselves with the Americans rather than the Chinese. This is not a matter of culture or morality, but rather a matter of national interest and political ethics.
Similarly, the Chinese also have complex calculations regarding the Americans, Europeans, and Russians. In Ye Qiquan’s calculations, overthrowing the American imperial order was not a priority. China’s priority was to force the Americans to choose the “North American – China axis” option. “Unifying Taiwan and completely closing the eastward security gap for China” was the cornerstone for launching this plan.
In Ye Qiquan’s plan, 2026 is a historic window of opportunity for China. Looking forward to this postponement means increased risks and costs for China. Once the United States overcomes its current fiscal, economic, and political crises, it will have the initiative to rebuild its imperial power structure . If the United States abandons the “North American-China axis,” China may fall into another “economic colonial cycle,” which could last up to 200 years.
If China’s current heroic families lead China to defeat, they will be condemned to the pillory of history. If they accomplish great feats, these families will become divine families of China and be blessed for eternity.
A US Perspective on the “Low Tide of the Imperial Order”
Ye Qiquan
qiquanye@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-4286-9746
Sunday, October 26, 2025
summary:
The fundamental reason for the current downturn in the United States lies in China’s interception of US tax revenue globally. This results in the “reliable tax revenue of the empire” failing to cover the “necessary costs of the empire’s operation.” This has led to widespread hostility towards China in the US and Europe, with a desire to completely defeat China. However, using confrontational strategies to completely defeat China at the national level is an unrealistic expectation. The fundamental reason for China’s long-term implementation of “destructive strategies” is that the current power groups do not share appropriate economic pricing and adjudication power with China. Cooperating with China to build a new imperial order is a worthwhile option. The main resistance to this option comes from emotional social resistance. Its supporting factor lies in data-driven rational factors.
Discussion and Summary
Europe and Russia may be entering a 200-year downturn/defensive cycle. The economic share of China and the Arab world will continue to rise. Rebuilding the world’s economic centers and adjusting the global wealth circulation chain are worth considering. However, the United States, as the central power of the imperial order, is currently facing a political downturn and a fiscal crisis.
There are likely many theories and hypotheses that can be used to trace the causes of America’s current predicament. Ye Qiquan insists that the main reason for America’s current predicament can be focused on China. He believes that “China’s interception of American tax revenue globally is the root cause of America’s current predicament.” Due to the continuous decline of America’s reliable tax revenue, it is unable to cover the costs of operating the empire. Addressing this root cause is the correct solution and path for America.
There are two options for eliminating the “Chinese diversion of US tax revenue.” One is to completely defeat China through confrontation, or to cooperate with China to rebuild the center of imperial power.
Given the current political reality, the expectation of completely defeating China at the national level is almost impossible to realize.
The root cause of China’s “destructive economic strategy” globally lies in the fact that the current imperial power bloc does not share appropriate economic pricing and adjudication power with China. The proposed joint establishment of power centers is an effective path to force China to completely abandon its “destructive strategy.”
The joint establishment of a power center, coupled with a comprehensive and in-depth cooperation mechanism, is conducive to the establishment of a long-term cooperative relationship between the two countries. At the same time, cooperation will help expand tax revenue sources, reduce strategic attrition for both sides, lower the operating costs of the imperial order, and eliminate each other’s greatest strategic adversaries.
Of course, jointly establishing an imperial power center with China would inevitably encounter resistance. This resistance mainly stems from emotional social factors rather than data-driven rational factors.
A Russian Perspective on the “New Global Order”
Ye Qiquan
qiquanye@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-4286-9746
Saturday, October 25, 2025
summary:
A war has effectively divided Russia into the “new political power bloc.” A “political buffer zone” is effectively established, isolating Russia from the development process of Europe. Europe established this buffer zone not only with the immediate goal of weakening Russia, but also with the expectation that it will bring more historical benefits. Moving this buffer zone to a geographical location most favorable to Russia’s long-term national interests will be a long-term national pursuit for Russia. This goal may take 100 years to achieve, or it may be accelerated. Russia and China have a long history of complexities, geopolitical complexities, and significant differences in cultural characteristics. These factors make the two countries wary of each other, hinder each other, and pay corresponding real and historical costs. However, the development priorities and expansion goals of the two countries in the next 100 years will not have major conflicts, which is a historical window for the two countries to cooperate deeply. Encouraging the leaders of the two countries to recognize this background will be the foundation for improving their cooperation, reducing the historical costs for both countries, and accelerating the growth of the “new political power bloc.” This is a difficult but extremely valuable task. After ensuring that Russia has established a secure national border in a favorable position, seeking a comprehensive reconciliation with Europe is also a solution that is in line with Russia’s long-term national interests. Furthermore, although the probability of this happening is extremely low, there is a theoretical possibility that the United States would seek cooperation with Russia to jointly address the challenge posed by China. Compared to cooperation with China, a cooperative approach between Russia and Europe/the United States is more in line with Russian cultural trends, philosophical logic, identity politics, and communication habits.
IV. Discussion and Summary
A nation’s long-term strategy is inevitably closely related to its overall security situation. It is also related to the nation’s realistic ambitions when formulating its national plans. These two points involve one constant and two variables. The constant is the nation’s overall security situation. One of the two variables is the nation’s realistic ambitions. The other variable is “the judgment of the nation’s overall security situation.”
A nation’s overall security situation is both a fact and a constant. However, there is no consensus on the understanding of this constant. One hundred people will produce one hundred different judgments because each person has a different perspective. Ye Qiquan analyzes Russia’s current national security situation from philosophical and historical perspectives, and he arrives at the following basic judgments.
4.1 Russia’s westward security is not only a current priority for Russia, but also a major security issue for Russia over the next 100 years.
4.2 Positioning Russia’s western security border in a geopolitical location that aligns with the country’s long-term interests will be a long-term objective for Russia over the next 100 years. The L1 line will be part of this objective.
4.3 Russia has a historic opportunity to achieve its major historical goals. Russia also has the opportunity to accelerate the achievement of these goals.
4.4 Mutual speculation and understanding of the long-term national goals and priorities of China and Russia are the philosophical and political foundation for these two countries to strengthen cooperation, reduce mutual vigilance, and minimize mutual attrition.
4.5 The 2022 war has formally classified Russia as part of the “Bloc of Emerging Political Forces,” a fact Russia must acknowledge. This forms the philosophical basis for Russia’s full commitment to the collaborative process within the “Bloc of Emerging Political Forces.” Speculating on and confirming China’s expansion priorities and work direction for the next 100 years forms the political basis for Russia’s full commitment to the collaborative process within the “Bloc of Emerging Political Forces.”
4.6 Whether there is a clear belief that Russia will be in a “defensive process” in the next 100 years, and whether it is confirmed that there will be no serious conflict between China and Russia in their national development priorities and work directions in the next 100 years, will be the political basis for China to carry out comprehensive cooperation with Russia.
4.7 Accelerating the work on projects 4.5 and 4.6 would expedite comprehensive cooperation between China and Russia. This cooperation is also the cornerstone for accelerating the development of the “Bloc of Emerging Political Forces.” This cooperation will not only benefit the domestic political situations of both countries but also their standing in the international political arena.
4.8 The relationship between China and Russia is complex, encompassing historical, geopolitical, and cultural clashes. Coordinating cooperation between these two countries and minimizing the historical costs arising from mutual wariness and restraint is essential, but also extremely difficult.
4.9 Achieving complete reconciliation with the European Central Region and establishing a relationship with the United States that aligns with Russia’s long-term national interests are both goals that serve Russia’s long-term national interests. Russia currently faces deep hostility from Europe and the United States, but this does not mean that Russia will forever lose this prospect. The possibility of the United States and the European Union forming a “US-Europe-Russia axis” to counter pressure from China cannot be ruled out.
The Chaos of Imperial Order from a European Perspective
Ye Qiquan
qiquanye@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-4286-9746
Monday, October 27, 2025
summary
Europeans are optimistic about the war in Ukraine. Their support for prolonging or even escalating the conflict is based on a political assumption: the “European victory theory.” From a practical and short-term perspective, this theory is supported by economic data, political realities, and historical experience. In fact, Europe does hold the initiative on the battlefield. However, from a long-term and geopolitical perspective, the “European defeat theory” may be more accurate. Europe has been divided into two parts by this war, leading to a significant weakening of its geopolitical power, a loss of political prestige and moral reputation, and a prolonged period of mutual attrition between the two opposing parts. China’s shift from supporting a strong Europe to weakening it has also contributed to this situation. Some firmly believe that since 2022, Europe has officially entered a potentially 200-year period of decline. During this period, political chaos in Europe will gradually intensify, with European countries not only engaging in external wars but also initiating internal conflicts. European cultural confidence and national self-confidence will gradually decline or even be lost. When Europeans can no longer endure this suffering, they will begin the process of finding a new path for Europe. Advancely evolving Europe’s philosophical logic will be a good way to shorten this decline. Only after Europe has evolved its underlying philosophical logic will they stop relentlessly suppressing the occasional political geniuses who can save Europe.
Discussion and Summary
Europeans are currently in a political low ebb. This is reflected not only in their low political standing in Europe, but also in the lack of political talent.
Europeans are obsessed with viewing the Ukrainian war from a current or short-term perspective. From this perspective, the “European victory” narrative enjoys widespread support. This leads to a general optimism among Europeans regarding the Ukrainian war, and consequently, a commitment to prolonging or escalating the conflict.
From both historical and philosophical perspectives, the impact of the Ukraine war on Europe has been almost entirely negative. This negative impact will further accelerate or exacerbate Europe’s decline.
Ye Qiquan believes that Europe officially entered a recessionary cycle that could last up to 200 years starting in 2022. This recession is due to factors including the fixed value of regional wealth, international politics, and geopolitics. Furthermore, Europe’s underlying philosophical logic is also a negative factor affecting its ability to rebuild an empire.
Ye Qiquan believes that the supporting factors for Europe’s resurgence include the following: Europe needs to acquire a war capability far exceeding that of other regions; energy is so cheap that it does not deplete Europe’s social wealth; Europe has successfully evolved its underlying philosophical logic; and the emergence of political geniuses has accelerated the process of “national unity” in Europe.
Obtaining these opportunities is difficult, which is why Ye Qiquan predicts that Europe’s recessionary cycle may last for 200 years or even longer. Current European policy should focus on “rebuilding the European integration process,” “finding genuine opportunities to align with the most powerful forces,” “maintaining Europe’s position as a pillar of wealth,” and conducting in-depth research into Europe’s philosophical shortcomings.
Copyright Notice:
Copyright is retained for 200 years, not the existing default term. Any commercial copying or distribution must ensure that at least 50% of the revenue belongs to the copyright holder. The minimum penalty for each commercial copy is $20,000 equivalent in 2025. Any commercial copying or distribution constitutes compliance with these rules.
A Japanese Perspective on the “New World Order”
Ye Qiquan
qiquanye@gmail.com
ORCID: 0000-0002-4286-9746
Sunday, October 26, 2025
summary:
Finding the right path is crucial to Japan’s historical future. In the impending period of “chaos before the start of a new order,” Japan will face enormous risks, but also the potential to seize opportunities. Thorough prior research and the development of comprehensive, multi-dimensional action plans can provide the right guidance for Japan’s choices at critical moments. The new East Asian order is a historical trend, but it is not yet fixed. Japan’s focus should be on in-depth research to steer events in a direction that benefits Japan’s long-term interests.
Discussion and Summary
In the impending “chaotic period before the start of the new order,” Japan has “virtually no initiative in political choices.” Japan cannot influence the direction and process of building a new order in East Asia. In the early stages, Japan, along with South Korea, is an inevitable member of the US alliance. “Japan cannot make any strategically valuable contribution at this stage.” Japan has no need to actively promote any process. In Ye Qiquan’s theoretical assumption, once the military conflict between the US alliance and the China alliance escalates to a medium-level hot war or higher, the US alliance will inevitably move its main military forces towards the Philippines to escape the coverage area of China’s short- and medium-range missiles. This major military mobilization will inevitably provide Japan and South Korea with an opportunity for political autonomy.
In Ye Qiquan’s discussion of the options for the United States to respond to China’s unification of Taiwan, these can be divided into two main groups: pre-emptive response plans and post-emptive response plans. Alternatively, they can be categorized by function into eight toolkits: “delaying tactics,” “peace talks,” and “confrontation.” Within each toolkit, the confrontational approach fails to guarantee the advantage of the US alliance. The main arguments are as follows.
A US alliance cannot land on Chinese territory.
The inability to land on Chinese territory means that the US alliance cannot completely defeat China at the national level.
The B- China alliance leads the US alliance in both the “effective range” of strategic and tactical weapons.
Ye Qiquan believes that each technological era has different dominant weapons on the battlefield. Equipment assuming the role of dominant battlefield weaponry must be superior in three fundamental aspects: range (kill distance), destructive effect, and economy (capability for large-scale deployment). Compared to the United States, China’s weapons undoubtedly possess an advantage in economic efficiency.
In terms of range, Chinese weapons also have a comparative advantage.
In terms of destructive effect, land-based weapons naturally have a greater advantage than sea-based weapons. Simultaneous air-to-ground launches of 2-4 medium-range missiles can ensure the creation of an effective kill zone of approximately 9 square kilometers at sea. Correspondingly, the area of land-based facilities susceptible to effective damage decreases exponentially.
Faced with China ‘s defensive offensive strategy, the American league had no advantage in winning.
China can pursue its “defensive-offensive strategy” within the coverage area of its medium-range missiles. This means China has the initiative in choosing battlefields in East Asia. Faced with China’s defensive strategy, the US-led alliance has no chance of success. Even if Europe as a whole joins the East Asian theater, it cannot change this trend.
The structure of the US alliance is no more stable than the structure of the China alliance.
Europe has effectively been expelled from the US imperial power leadership group since 2022 and has become a de facto US tax zone. Europe will not be able to end its state of war with Russia until at least the end of 2026, and this state of war may even continue until the end of 2029. During this period, China effectively holds the political initiative over Europe. If Europe attempts to become a base for a war of attrition waged by the US alliance, China will inevitably instigate chaos in central Europe to thwart this effort.
From South Korea’s perspective, if the United States’ war-fighting capabilities begin to weaken, South Korea will be unable to cope alone with the military and political pressure from North Korea, Russia, or China. If the conflict between the US and China escalates to a medium-level hot war, South Korea’s withdrawal from the conflict process will be inevitable. Once South Korea withdraws, Japan will undoubtedly follow suit.
Japan ‘s war prospects are bleak, and its political prospects are even more perilous.
If the war in East Asia escalates to a medium- or higher level of hot conflict, Japan’s war prospects are quite bleak. Its political prospects are even bleaker. Therefore, it is essential for Japan to develop various contingency plans in advance; the prediction and response to the nation’s future are crucial.
Japan has not completely lost its opportunities.
The escalating political antagonism in East Asia stems primarily from two significant events: Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands in 2012 and South Korea’s deployment of THAAD in 2016. In fact, Chinese politicians do not believe these two egregious incidents were driven by the inner impulses of Japan and South Korea. However, political animosity towards Japan and South Korea among the Chinese public remains unabated. This hostility is intensifying. However, Japan is not without opportunities to ease tensions with the Chinese public. If Japan seizes a crucial opportunity, coupled with guidance from politicians on both sides, there is a chance to mitigate the animosity towards Japan among the Chinese people. Japan should conduct in-depth research, develop contingency plans, and provide support for shifting public opinion in this direction.
A new East Asian order may be in Japan’s long-term interests.
There is no definitive solution for the new East Asian order. At least four scenarios and six possible outcomes are possible. Japan’s focus should be on conducting in-depth research beforehand and guiding events in a direction that benefits Japan’s long-term interests.
(All statistics are from publicly available data prior to April 2022)
The Starting Point, Path, and Significance of the New Order in East Asia (Research Outline)
Ye Qiquan’s first public appearance: September 15, 2025
Abstract: The new East Asian order is the key and symbol of the formal formation of the Chinese empire. Its cornerstone is the establishment of a solid military pillar in Taiwan by China. This pillar will become a “land bridge salient” or “sword of land power” eroding maritime power. This “land sword” not only compresses the naval power of the United States but also severely weakens the “naval characteristics” of Japan and South Korea. Thus, it lays the foundation for China to establish a “new East Asian order” led by China. Based on Taiwan as a cornerstone, there are at least three paths to establishing a “new East Asian order.” These are: the two-way path, the three-way path, and the four-way path. The two-way path involves a fierce conflict between the US alliance and the China alliance, establishing a new East Asian order through low-intensity conflict and mutual compromise, with the US alliance on one side, Japan and South Korea on the other, and the China alliance on the other. The four-way path involves the Russian alliance on one side, the US alliance on the other, Japan and South Korea on the other, and China on the other, establishing a new East Asian order through struggle and compromise. From a historical perspective, the two-way path best aligns with China’s long-term interests. For Japan, South Korea, and North Korea, it also allows for the establishment of the most stable regional order and the optimal economic order. The different outcomes under different paths will present entirely different political, economic, geopolitical, and historical significance.
The Path and Variables to Establishing a New Order in East Asia
(Research outline/political prediction/political speculation)
Ye Qiquan
September 15, 2025
Abstract: From a historical perspective, a new order in East Asia is a reasonable expectation. This new order reflects a new historical trend: the rise of land-based politics and the decline of sea-based politics. Specifically in East Asia, two factors drive this process. One is the overall trend: land-based weapons have surpassed sea-based weapons in both maximum and effective range. The other is that Taiwan, as China’s land-based power base, has severely eroded its sea power (including naval operational range, naval armed forces, and naval political capabilities). Once the United States’ naval power in East Asia declines, and the naval attributes of Japan and South Korea weaken, the establishment of a new political order in East Asia will be a result of historical progress. However, the process of establishing this new order is subject to variables, and its corresponding outcomes will differ accordingly, with significant differences between the historical process and the historical results. These differences mainly depend on the different ways the United States responds to the new East Asian order. Different US responses can stimulate “two-way,” “three-way,” and “four-way” paths. These three different paths may establish four different new East Asian orders.
The Roles and Power Struggles of China, the United States, and Russia in the New East Asian Order
(Research outline/political prediction/political speculation)
Ye Qiquan
September 15, 2025
summary:
A political assumption is that the old imperial order, dominated by the United States, relied on four main pillars of power: the North American pillar, the European pillar, the East Asian pillar, and the Israeli pillar. In China’s construction of its imperial structure, the East Asian pillar of the United States is the first to be impacted. The United States must first assess this reality and formulate the best response plan. China has reached a historical juncture in building its imperial structure. Closing its security gaps in the East is crucial to the speed and success of its imperial construction. Its focus is not only on East Asia but also inevitably includes the security of Southeast Asia, the Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean passage. The competition between these two established players and newcomers dominates the process of building a new order in East Asia. However, Russia is not inactive. It may become a key third party, reaping significant unexpected gains in balancing European actions.
summary:
In a historical stage where land-based weapons surpass sea-based weapons in both “range” and “effective range,” the decline of sea power and sea politics is an inevitable historical trend. The rise of land politics will bring the following irreversible historical trends: A. The strategic importance of aircraft carrier battle groups will gradually decline, eventually becoming theater-level weapons. B. The trend of economic globalization will stagnate, while the importance of regional cooperation and regional order will increase. The ability of financial power to manipulate political power will slightly decrease. C. Under the leadership of the Chinese empire, cooperation among regional land power centers will become the main framework of a new global imperial order. Under the impact of these historical trends, the establishment of a new East Asian order is an inevitable historical outcome. In the process of establishing this new East Asian order, the United States and China will be the main variables, with Russia having a high probability of becoming an important variable as well. Although Japan and South Korea are independent political and economic components in the new East Asian order, they have always been passive in its construction. Different interaction schemes among these key participants may trigger different dynamic processes and different outcomes for the new East Asian order.
Speculations about China’s future:
Speculation on China’s proposed governance plan for Taiwan
Forecasts regarding the prospects of Europe:
Predictions regarding Russia.
Predictions about the United States
Theoretical assumptions about the Arab world
Philosophical assumptions about the development of empires
Concerns about “highly efficient slaves”
Ye Qiquan’s Philosophical Discipline Hypothesis
Note 1: The initial publication date is only used to mark content that did not previously have an initial publication date. For any content that has been published with an earlier date, the earliest publication date will be used.
Note 2: All published content is protected by copyright.
Note 3: All research topics, content, extensions, and disseminations based on the published content must be authorized by Ye Qiquan. Ye Qiquan must be ranked second in the main body of the research topic.
Note 4: Any person (legal entity or natural person) may participate in the tort claim process. Members participating in the tort claim may share up to 80% of the compensation amount.
The Ukraine War: A Clash Between Victory and Defeat in Europe
Ye Qiquan
May 7, 2025
Abstract: The war on Ukrainian soil has lasted for over three years. Most people are pessimistic about a near-term end to the war. This is due not only to the disparity in strength but also to ideological differences arising from differing perspectives on the war’s future. Currently, at least two completely opposite outlooks exist: one is the “European victory” theory, and the other is the “European defeat” theory. Both theories have their own supporting arguments. If the “European victory” theory gains widespread acceptance, the Ukrainian war will likely continue for a longer period. If the “European defeat” theory gains wider acceptance, then a de-escalation and contraction of the Ukrainian war will gradually occur.
Discussion: The war in Ukraine has lasted for over three years. A key basis for this protracted conflict is the “European victory” narrative. This narrative supports and encourages the political idealism of European citizens and politicians, thus supporting a strategy of prolonging the war. Conversely, the “European defeat” narrative reminds Europeans to scale down the war and shorten its duration. Currently, the “European victory” narrative is dominant, while the “European defeat” narrative is slowly gaining traction.
The Boundaries of the Application of the Theory of European Victory
Ye Qiquan’s first appearance: June 16, 2025
Abstract: European politicians and public opinion generally support the war in Ukraine and are striving to prolong and intensify it. This fact is based on three main reasons: historical idealism rooted in widespread anti-Russian sentiment, realistic idealism fueled by persistent anti-Russian sentiment, and quantifiable political and economic advantages. The first two form the basis of public opinion under the guise of political correctness. The latter becomes a tool for politicians to pursue their political interests. However, the European victory theory has its limitations. Once these limitations are crossed, Europe’s quantifiable political and economic advantages cease to exist, thus triggering another war prediction: the European defeat theory. Both the European victory and European defeat theories have their fertile ground. Their suitable ground depends on the changing international situation and the shifting geopolitical forces.
in conclusion:
The “European Victory Theory” is based on an analysis of the operational mechanisms of the Ukrainian war over the past three years. Although the war is not yet over, the outcome is largely predetermined. This was achieved by establishing a “Ukrainian defense line” and a “northern blockade line” to isolate Russia from the European development process. By prolonging the war, continuously wearing down and compressing Russia, and awaiting further political changes, this approach favors the realization of European realism and historical ideals. Not only do numerous economic and social indicators support the “European Victory Theory,” but the course of the war and the actual battlefront also validate its continued validity. This theory may provide legitimacy for the continuation of the Ukrainian war, making an end to the war and an effective ceasefire difficult. However, the “European Victory Theory” may have a boundary of applicability. This boundary may limit its application in eastern Ukraine and beyond, bounded by the L2 line.
footnote:
1. All calculation data are from the World Bank database and other widely recognized sources. Please see the appendix for details.
2. Data and Materials. All data used in the calculations were published before April 2022. Due to the sheer volume of work, annual data updates are not feasible. Even if data updates are necessary due to changes, the 2022 data will still be used to avoid disrupting the overall calculation system.
Calculation of National Overall War Capability
First published by Ye Qiquan: December 7, 2023
introduction:
Concerns about a full-scale conflict between China and the United States are likely the theoretical basis for the “China prudence faction’s” delay in the unification process. Ye Qiquan is willing to discuss this concern from two perspectives: “the overall war capability of a nation” and “the overall war capability of a war alliance.”
(The predictions made under this calculation model that “the war in Ukraine will be fought between the L1 and L2 lines for a long time” and “the war will not end or cease completely before the end of 2026” have been proven by the course of the war in Ukraine for more than three years.)
Based on the war of February 24, 2022 (the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Ukraine War, the 2022 European War), Ye Qiquan keenly sensed that the world had entered a new era—an era of competition primarily through armed forces. This war also shattered his previous admiration for politicians. He not only realized that the political wisdom of European politicians might be far below the average level, but more importantly, he recognized the low moral character of European politicians.
Yeh Chi-chuan insists that ” as long as a politician’s starting point is for the sake of his country and nation, whatever he does is in accordance with political morality,” and the opposite is not politically moral. In the preface to his book, *Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impacts, Influences, and Risks*, he states directly that he is not only worried about the political capabilities of European politicians but also about their political morality, which could lead Europe into East Asian conflicts in 2026 or later. This dangerous move would exacerbate global chaos, expand its scope, and prolong its duration. This concern has also prompted him to deeply consider methods for assessing a nation’s overall warfighting capabilities. He believes that existing rankings such as “World Firepower Rankings,” “World Air Force Power Rankings,” “World Innovation Index,” “World Food Dependence Index,” and various other military power rankings are unsuitable for ” assessing a nation’s overall warfighting capabilities.”
Based on the above concerns, Ye Qiquan introduced his calculation system for calculating and evaluating “national overall war power”.
Note 1: This is an attachment from a mass email sent on September 30, 2025.
Note 2: The main content was first published on the PPPNET blog website on December 7, 2023. Its content is also part of the book “Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impacts, Effects, and Risks,” published in December 2023.
Calculation of the overall war capability of the alliance
Ye Qiquan’s first appearance: December 9, 2023
Based on the “National Overall War Capability Calculation Model,” Ye Qiquan expanded and established the “Military Group Overall War Capability Calculation Model.” This model is used to calculate the overall war capability of military groups.
summary
According to calculations from a new system for assessing the intensity of war among nations and groups, the United States and its allies are unable to defeat China in the theaters of war around East Asia. Faced with China’s defensive yet offensive actions in East Asia, the US and its allies are virtually helpless. In various scenarios and levels of conventional military conflict, the US-led alliance cannot gain an advantage. The premise that the US-led alliance will not suffer a major military defeat depends on the management and control of the war by politicians on both sides. Avoiding significant military losses to the enemy while ensuring one’s own side suffers minimal losses will be a peculiar characteristic of potential wars around East Asia. However, if the conflict spirals out of control and escalates into a full-scale war, there is a very high probability of nuclear war. Once public opinion in Western countries supporting nuclear war is aroused, Western politicians will be powerless to stop it. This forces China to assume the primary responsibility for curbing Western public opinion advocating the use of nuclear weapons. China may need to further rethink its nuclear armament doctrine to align with the objective needs of global security and stability, as well as the world’s expectations of China.
(Completed at the end of 2023 , no updates, just copied from this part)
Note 1: This is an attachment to an internal email. It is not a complete document, but rather a component copied from a longer document.
Note 2: The predictions made under this calculation model that “the war in Ukraine will be fought between the L1 and L2 lines for a long time” and “the war will not end or cease completely before the end of 2026” have been proven by the course of the war in Ukraine for more than three years.
Order, “sub-identity,” historical innocence, and governance of Taiwan
(Research Outline)
Ye Qiquan’s first public appearance: September 30, 2025
introduction:
The diplomatic quagmire of post-Soviet Russia, the failures of the Soviet Union and the United States in governing Afghanistan, and Armenians’ pursuit of historical debts against Turkey are all key factors that have caused concern among China’s conservative faction regarding the governance of Taiwan. I would like to discuss my understanding of this issue from the perspectives of imperial power, peripheral tendencies, ethnic identity, and historical innocence.
Key points:
I. The “Power Gap” is the Fundamental Factor in Attracting External Forces: The Taiwan Story
II. The Foundation of Imperial Order: The “Power Gap” Between the Center and the Periphery
III. Sub-ethnic Identity: Damaging China’s Historical Interests
IV. Concerns about historical innocence
4.1 We should strive to win back people’s hearts as quickly as possible.
4.2 The central government should avoid bearing historical responsibility.
4.2.1 Political firewall
4.2.2 Economic Firewall
4.2.3 Free-flowing firewall
4.2.4 Attraction Firewall
Note 1: This is an attachment to a mass email. Note 2: Ye Qiquan declares that this is a research outline. Any research project using this outline, in whole or in part, as its framework must have a prior cooperation agreement signed, and Ye Qiquan must be listed as the second author in the main paper. Parties who provide clues about infringement and participate in the claims process can share 80% of the final compensation amount.
Ethnic sub-identity is the basis for national strife/division (research outline)
Ye Qiquan first announced: September 30, 2025
Foreword
Russia’s “post-imperial disintegration syndrome” (or “post-imperial pain”) will last at least 200 years. The greatest pain lies in the “identity entanglement among Russians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians.” This sub-identity entanglement under the larger identity will dominate the “pain syndrome” for the next 200 years. This entanglement will not only manifest as “cultural alienation and identity alienation,” but will also inevitably lead to border conflicts, economic depletion, mutual security losses, and even mutual warfare. The current friendly and cooperative relationship between Belarusians and Russians cannot last, nor can it be the norm for the entire course of history.
From a historical perspective, the history of ethnic integration in the Chinese Empire is one of the most successful cases in the world. This success is attributed not only to the philosophical choices of the dominant ethnic group but also to the geographical environment in which the Chinese Empire was situated. Of course, the historical process of the Chinese Empire also included a period of accelerated alienation of ethnic identity. This accelerated alienation was both a cause and a consequence of the empire’s decline and political chaos.
Modern China also has many lessons to learn from the enormous political costs brought about by the alienation of national identity. Ignoring these lessons could lead to even greater practical and historical costs.
Addressing or correcting the issue of ethnic sub-identity alienation will become the biggest challenge in governing Taiwan.
summary
Given years of pro-independence maneuvering, it’s reasonable to expect Taiwanese people to resent “one country, two systems.” They have also been misled into believing that mainland China is imposing “one country, two systems” on them. However, the reality is quite the opposite. Due to the negative effects of the Hong Kong “one country, two systems” model and the backlash against mainlanders in Taiwan, “one country, two systems” is widely labeled as treasonous by mainland citizens. Because the Taiwanese government’s frequent manipulation of the pro-independence issue in recent years has angered the mainland central government, the mainland officially stripped Taiwan of its substantive political space under “one country, two systems” in August 2022. Furthermore, “one country, two systems” harms China’s geopolitical interests, leaves a window for foreign interference in China’s internal affairs, hinders national integration, slows down China’s historical progress, and sows the seeds for future secession. These are the reasons why the central government refuses to grant Taiwan “one country, two systems.”
Note 1: This is an attachment to a mass email. Note 2: Ye Qiquan declares that this is a research outline. Any research project using this outline, in whole or in part, as its framework must have a prior cooperation agreement signed, and Ye Qiquan must be listed as the second author in the main paper. Parties who provide clues about infringement and participate in the claims process can share 80% of the final compensation amount.
The Taiwan issue is a risk that is controllable or almost risk-free.
Ye Qiquan’s first public appearance: September 30, 2025
summary
During any action against Taiwan, China would encounter virtually no external resistance. Even in the aftermath, China could remain invincible by adhering to three key principles: preventing Europe from joining the war or destroying Europe as a base for attrition warfare; using medium-range missiles as the primary means of warfare and employing a defensive-offensive strategy to repel the armed forces of the US-led coalition; completely expelling the US military and political presence in East Asia; and ensuring the ability to preemptively eliminate the option of nuclear war.
Table of contents
I. Overview of Principles II. Defense of Taiwan III. Theater Defense in East Asia IV. Uncertainty in Europe V. Countermeasures against South Korea VI. Countermeasures against Japan VII. Naval Warfare Around Australia and Expulsion from Philippine Bases VIII. Countering a Comprehensive Seaway Blockade IX. The Path to a Systematic and Comprehensive Confrontation XII. Experimental Nuclear War
summary
Considering the issue from multiple dimensions and perspectives, unifying Taiwan would not pose a significant risk to China. The risks are practically controllable, even minimal. At least during the process of landing on Taiwan, no major risks are expected.
Note: This is an attachment from an email sent to Chinese diplomats.
nuclear war options
First published by Ye Qiquan: March 29, 2023
summary:
In the event of a military conflict between China and the United States in East Asia, the option of nuclear war cannot be completely ruled out. China must assume the responsibility of “eliminating the nuclear option in advance.” Once the nuclear war option is definitively eliminated, the probability of China’s military operations in East Asia failing is quite low, especially if China adopts a “defensive-offensive strategy,” in which case the US alliance would have virtually no chance of winning.
summary
Escalating the level of mutual response is one of the fundamental characteristics of war. Even in the event of a full-scale conflict between China and the United States, this pattern will not be escaped. The conventional path would be from harassment warfare, gradually escalating to semi-contact warfare, low-intensity hot war, medium-intensity war, and finally, major war. Crucially, the possibility of a nuclear war between China and the United States cannot be ruled out, as China’s actions to unify Taiwan would have an extremely severe impact on the United States, far exceeding any war since World War II. China should bravely assume the responsibility of “preemptively eliminating the option of nuclear war” before initiating any unification actions. Once the option of nuclear war is definitively eliminated, the probability of China’s military failure in East Asia is quite low, especially if China adopts a “defensive-offensive strategy,” in which case the US alliance would have virtually no chance of victory.
China already possesses the advantage of “effective range” for its weapons.
First published by Ye Qiquan: March 29, 2023
summary:
Beyond the “effective range” advantage of China’s strategic weapons, its operational-level weapons also possess a reliable “effective range” advantage compared to the United States. This gives China a de facto battlefield advantage in all levels of conventional warfare. This advantage is particularly overwhelming when China pursues a “defensive-offensive strategy.”
[Note 1: All data is from databases prior to April 2022. Please forgive the lack of time and energy to update the data. However, Ye Qiquan is confident that the progress of Chinese weaponry will not stagnate in the near future. Even without updating the latest data, the upward trend of Chinese weaponry will not change, and the above conclusions will not be significantly deviated from.]
[Note 2: Even if China invests heavily in developing its aircraft carrier battle groups, their role in a Sino-US conflict in East Asia will primarily be limited to battlefield isolation or theater deterrence.]
In the “defensive theater” of East Asia, China’s winning force will be theater-range missiles.
In Taiwan’s “offensive battlefield,” China’s winning force will be short-range missiles, battlefield drones, and battlefield robots.
In a “defensive theater” targeting Europe’s overall involvement in the East Asian battlefield, China’s winning weapon is the strategy of “creating chaos in Europe and defeating the enemy outside the defensive zone.”
The true bottom line for ensuring China’s survival is possessing 3,500 nuclear warheads and demonstrating to the people of North America and Europe China’s resolve to use them. This is China’s capability to “preemptively eliminate the option of nuclear war.” [Details will be explained in another article.]
summary:
Based on the three key elements of a weapon’s “effective range,” it can be reasonably concluded that ” China’s operational-level weapons already possess an advantage in effective range.” This advantage can ensure China’s victory in a protracted war of attrition.
China’s strategic weapons have an effective range exceeding that of the United States.
First published by Ye Qiquan: March 29, 2023
summary:
If the United States deploys carrier strike groups as its primary weapon, China’s medium-range missiles will correspondingly join the battlefield. This is determined by the principle of reciprocal response in war. Politicians’ strategies may delay or slightly postpone this response process, but they cannot prevent it from happening. This is one of the essential attributes of war. Furthermore, as the highest-level conflict option for nations, the United States’ ability to withstand a nuclear strike of equal yield is significantly weaker than China’s. Ye Qiquan believes that once China possesses 3,500 nuclear warheads, it will effectively have the ability to “preemptively eliminate the option of nuclear war.” Whether analyzed from the perspective of the “effective range” of strategic weapons or from the perspective of actually withstanding a nuclear strike, Ye Qiquan believes that China has the advantage.
[All data comes from databases prior to April 2022. Please forgive us for not having the energy and time to update the data.]
2026 is significantly better than 2028 or 2029 .
Ye Qiquan (September 22, 2025)
[Note: This is the content of an email attachment.]
China’s unification action, in terms of military scale, is a small-to-medium-scale military operation. However, in essence, it will become the highest-level political action of this century. It essentially declares China’s formal commencement of building an imperial system, potentially a G2, G3, or G4 structure. The United States must relinquish its sole right to tax the world.
If all 14 questions above have relatively favorable answers, then I believe taking action in 2026 is far better than in 2028 or 2029. The reasons are as follows:
1. Europe continues its strategy of isolating Russia from the continent. It will be unable to achieve a shift in public opinion and policy until at least the end of 2026.
2. Although American reformists are exploring solutions to deal with Russia, they will not be able to gather enough political resources to win Russia over until at least 2027.
3. Even with increased pressure on Russia, Europe will not expel it east of the L2 line. Europe’s fundamental goal is to politically, culturally, and economically expel Russia from Europe. Neither the United States nor Europe has a plan to completely defeat Russia militarily.
4. Once Europe believes that the current “Ukrainian trench” is stable and strong enough to effectively isolate Russia from its development process, it will gradually reduce military pressure. Moreover, reformers in the United States are currently pushing for this direction.
5. Russia will never relinquish its “European” identity. For every slight gesture from Europeans to Russians, China must pay a substantial price to offset the allure of European identity.
6. If the Europeans had not forced the Russians east of the L2 line, the Russians would not have had an urgent need to proactively upgrade the level of their alliance with China. This placed the Russians in a detached position when facing the East Asian crisis.
7. Once the confrontation between Europe and Russia intensifies, the cost for China to proactively upgrade its alliance with Russia will rise rapidly. Even accelerating Russia’s move towards the L1 line might not be enough to offset the costs.
8. The United States may re-elevate Europe from a tax haven to an imperial power group, making it a base for supporting its war of attrition. The probability of this new union forming would rise rapidly once Europe is convinced that Russia will not be a major threat.
9. Even if a new North American-European-Russian agreement doesn’t materialize, it’s possible that these three parties will feign cooperation to increase their demands on China. Especially if Europe is committed to joining the US alliance, China will be forced to pay a huge political and geographical price.
The cost of fate and history.
2026 is a golden opportunity bestowed upon China; it cannot be missed! If, due to insufficient preparation, a postponement is unavoidable, we urge China’s heroic families, even disregarding the restrictions on military action in 2027, to proceed in 2027 if possible. Each day of delay not only amplifies the risks but also undoubtedly increases the costs. For the sake of national rejuvenation, for historical renown, and for family honor, we earnestly request the joint efforts of China’s heroic families. In particular, we urge reputable and prominent Chinese families to join the great cause of national rejuvenation. Self-preservation in isolation is not a viable strategy; achieving great deeds and establishing a legacy is the true measure of survival.
The cornerstone of the Chinese empire lies in Taiwan.
Ye Qiquan (First draft September 22, 2025. Submitted September 30, 2025)
Abstract: Order is always needed. Empires, as a constraining force in the world order, are always needed. The development and decline of empires are influenced by many conditions. A new East Asian order based on Taiwan is a prerequisite for closing the security gap in China’s eastward expansion. Taiwan has, in effect, become the cornerstone of the development of the Chinese empire.
VI. Taiwan is the cornerstone of the Chinese empire.
6.1 To stop China’s chronic bleeding wounds and reduce the historical costs of China’s development.
6.2 Establish a robust “land-based salient” or “land-based sword of force” to compress the United States’ naval power in the Western Pacific and the Sea of Japan region. Reduce the maritime power status of Japan and South Korea, forcing them to lean towards “land-based force.”
6.3 This became the basis for compressing American political power, forcing Japan and South Korea to gradually break away from American control.
6.4 To force the United States to react, and based on the United States’ response plan, to reduce the United States’ base of presence, or to expel the United States’ political and military presence from East Asia.
6.5 Establish a “New East Asian Order” to completely close China’s eastward security gap. Based on this, extend China’s land power influence to Southeast Asia, the Strait of Malacca, and the eastern Indian Ocean.
6.6 Shift China’s military investment from protecting its eastern borders to upholding its economic jurisdiction. Strengthen China’s economic pricing power and economic adjudication power. From a historical perspective, reduce the cost for China to maintain its imperial “core”.
(First draft on September 22, 2025. Submitted on September 30, 2025)
Divine Power Summoning Device in Taiwan
(Research Outline/Political Speculation)
Ye Qiquan (September 28, 2025)
Abstract: Taiwan is China’s magic wand. While lacking evidence, it can be inferred that the promise of unifying Taiwan was a major reason for someone’s turnaround from their 2011 predicament. Delaying this promise caused them to lose their formidable armor. China’s current dominant hero family will also eventually lose its advantage if it misses the opportunity to achieve great things. Conversely, the current passive hero family can rebuild its advantage by returning to the right path.
4.6 The “prudential” faction in China may worry about the risks involved in the unification process and the difficulties of governance after unification. I will present my views on these concerns later. The overall opinion is that “the risks are manageable,” and this concerns not only China’s immediate interests but also the course of its history. I pray that heroes and their families will strive to be heroes of Chinese history, not enemies of its progress.
(September 28, 2025)
The first version was completed on September 15, 2025, and was sent to the diplomatic system on September 23, 2025.
This is a mass email sent on September 15, 2025. It serves only as proof of the publication date to demonstrate the initial public release date of a portion of the written content and research outline.
This is a mass email sent on September 30, 2025. It was used to confirm the initial publication date of some writing content and research outlines.
This is a mass email sent on November 7, 2025. It was used to confirm the publication date of some research content and outline. In its content, the email predicted the risks facing Chinese military leaders. It also predicted that if China’s three main political blocs could not find a solution to deeply entangle and bind them together, all three would be at political risk.