Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis: Volume 1, Issue 3. August 2026
Focus 1: China’s Failure in the Process of National Reunification
Focus 2: China’s “July 1st Mechanism”
Focus 3: The Philosophical Definition and Value of War
This issue of the journal contains two articles about the US-China summit. Although both are published in the same issue, these two closely related articles were actually first published a month apart. The article, first published in April 2026, predicts that the US, by simply arranging a US-China summit, will postpone China’s unification process by approximately four years. The article, first published in May, confirms the former prediction. It confirms that Chinese politicians, for their own benefit, have betrayed China’s national interests by agreeing not to initiate the unification process during Xi Jinping’s term. Worse still for China, the unification process has already been effectively postponed until after 2029. This will be a strategic defeat for China. Unless China produces another strong politician with political maneuvering abilities comparable to Xi Jinping, this defeat cannot be reversed.
Another major section of this issue discusses the event announced by China on July 1, 2025. It focuses on the nature of this event, its causes, structural instability, and possible drift directions.
In the philosophy section, two articles were published discussing the philosophical definition and value of war. Although there are only two articles, they are expected to spark a series of debates.
3-0 Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis, Issue 3 – Table of Contents – PPP Bookstore
Numerous reports confirm that the leaders of the United States and China will meet in mid-May 2026. This represents a crucial victory for the United States. Without investing excessive political resources, the US has secured a strategic truce of approximately four years simply by arranging a summit meeting. Due to the political environment surrounding this summit and its subsequent political effects, the process of China’s reunification with Taiwan has been postponed until at least 2029, or even later. This provides the US with at least four crucial years for recovery. The US can use this window to restore and even strengthen its overall warfighting capabilities and overall national competitiveness. China, on the other hand, is thus placed on a strategic defensive position. It cannot be ruled out that China may forever lose the historical opportunity to grow into a dominant empire.
3-1 Delaying China’s Reunification: The US Wins a Key Battle – PPP Bookstore
The US’s advantage began even before the Sino-US summit. A month ago, Ye Qiquan asserted that the US had already gained a four-year period of strategic stability by arranging this meeting. This assertion has now been reaffirmed. The Xi Jinping administration has promised the US that it will not initiate China’s unification process during his term. Although the Sino-US summit is scheduled for May 13-15, 2026, Chinese official media proactively pledged “mutual support and common prosperity” and “laying a more solid foundation for Sino-US relations” in their pre-summit propaganda on the 12th and 13th. During the subsequent summit, Chinese political leaders repeatedly and publicly promised the US “not to initiate unification,” attempting to gain political protection from the US government for the “uncertain future” of these politicians.
3-2: US Wins Another Round; Chinese Politicians Offer Surrender – PPP Bookstore
In fact, Xi Jinping’s political life is over. The time has come to give him a political summary. When historians, both now and in the future, summarize Xi Jinping’s political career, the issue of China’s unification will be a central point. If China ultimately achieves unification, then Xi Jinping’s historical conclusion will be largely amicable and moderate. After all, Xi Jinping has made significant contributions to stabilizing the political situation in Northwest China. He is also the hero who corrected the course of Hong Kong’s politics. However, if China ultimately loses the opportunity for unification, then Xi Jinping will become a historical sinner and a traitor, because he has squandered the historical window of opportunity for China to achieve unification in 2026.
3-3 Political Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Rule (Ye Qiquan Edition) – PPP Bookstore
Because China’s strategic assessment system is rooted in Western models, the Chinese political system is filled with political elites cultivated under these Western models. Even if these elites still uphold Chinese patriotism, their assessments of overall national strength, overall war capability, and overall competitiveness are entirely subservient to the Western assessment system. This makes them unanimously opposed to China’s plan to unify Taiwan by force. Their opposition is based on their fears, which are mainly reflected in the following pillars: China’s overall national strength cannot counter the US bloc; the intervention of Japan and South Korea will drag China into a long-term process of national power depletion; the continued resistance from the Taiwanese people will cause China to suffer long-term losses; and the military unification of Taiwan will set back China’s development process. However, Ye Qiquan’s views are completely opposite to theirs. This is reflected in the following: China’s overall national war capability surpassed that of the United States by 2022; Japan and South Korea, initially inevitable participants in a Sino-US war, would inevitably join China’s camp in the later stages; military unification is a shortcut to rapidly establishing a new East Asian order; the new East Asian order is the cornerstone of the Sino-Asian empire; the new East Asian order is the cornerstone that forces the United States to choose the “North American-East Asian axis”; the establishment of the next generation of world order will inevitably involve a period of chaos; the Taiwan base, the new East Asian order, and China’s military unification action are key to shortening this period of chaos; compared to other options, the “North American-East Asian axis” is more readily accepted by the Americans.
3-4 The Fears of China’s Moderates Become an Obstacle to National Reunification – PPP Bookstore
War is a direct driving force of biological evolution. The state of war is not unique to humans, but is shared by all living things in the Earth’s ecosystem.
Warfare is a continuous competitive action undertaken by a group to secure survival and reproduction within its ecosystem. At the individual level, war manifests as combat capability, which is also a heritable trait. An individual’s combat capability can be strengthened or weakened throughout its life cycle. At the group level, war manifests as a persistent state. Even small differences in overall combat capability between competing species can have significant subsequent impacts at the group level and throughout history. Altruism and selfishness are two terms that inevitably arise when discussing the overall combat capability of a group. Generally, actions by individuals to enhance their combat capability will inevitably enhance the overall combat capability of the group. At the group level, the principle of altruism takes precedence. The principle of altruism is fundamental to ensuring the survival and reproduction of a species or group.
When war is simply summarized, it delivers destruction, slaughter, and harm. However, if we evaluate war within the context of biological evolution, its overall effects are positive and beneficial. Warfare and the pressure of war, as environmental pressures, drive biological evolution. War is the sole tool for selecting the species composition of Earth’s ecosystem. Through war, a complex and intricate system of ecological positions on Earth is established. Within the same species, war is also the dominant means of establishing internal resource allocation order. Furthermore, war is an effective tool for preventing or slowing down the self-degradation of species (including humans).
On July 1, 2025, China announced the establishment of the “Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Decision-Making and Coordination Mechanism.” This was a public announcement of a transfer of China’s “final political decision-making power.” While this transfer of political power actually occurred before the announcement date, the announcement date is a crucial marker of the formal operation of the new political power execution process. Therefore, naming this “unconventional transfer of political power” the “July 1st Mechanism” is reasonable. The reasons for the “July 1st Mechanism” may be very complex and difficult to trace clearly, but Xi Jinping’s breach of his political promise to “unify the country during his term” is likely a significant factor. Other contributing factors may involve his conflicts with the military and with other political families in China.
3-7 “July 1st Mechanism”: Definition and Speculated Causes – PPP Bookstore
The announcement published in the People’s Daily on July 1, 2025, is essentially a declaration of a transfer of China’s “final political decision-making power.” This announcement formally declares that the “final decision-making power” over China’s “power operation and execution procedures” has been completely transferred from the Xi Jinping group to the newly established “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” Given the special significance of this date, naming the new Chinese power structure the “July 1 Mechanism” is reasonable. However, this mechanism has a fatal flaw from its inception: neither the “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body” nor the “Chinese military” have received sufficient “orthodox” support within it. This flaw cannot guarantee that the politically dominant party can smoothly maintain its political advantage. On the contrary, their political advantage may be partially or even completely reversed. Their political opponents, on the other hand, could fully utilize the power of the complete “orthodox” support to achieve a complete resurgence or a partial victory.
3-8 The Structure and Defects of China’s “July 1st Mechanism” – PPP Bookstore
China’s “July 1st mechanism” is an unstable power order. The reasons for this instability are difficult to fathom, but it is clearly the result of a brutal power struggle among multiple political forces. Within the Chinese military, there may be insufficient political ability, resources, or operational skills among its leaders, preventing the military from gaining support from powerful political forces. This could be a significant reason why the military lacks the protection of “traditional authority.” For Xi Jinping, the surprise attack was the fundamental and direct cause of losing ultimate political decision-making power in China. However, they retained complete “traditional authority” and full administrative power. This outcome may be the result of a desperate resistance from the core members of Xi Jinping’s group, or more likely, the result of manipulation behind the scenes by powerful political families in China. For Hu Jintao’s political group and Hu Chunhua himself, they are shining political stars during the window of opportunity from April to October 2025. This also means they will be the obvious candidates to bear the “historical responsibility for illegal actions.” Hu Jintao’s group may be the actual leaders of the “July 1st mechanism,” or they may be a temporary performance group. Other powerful political families in China appear to be absent from the “July 1 mechanism,” but they are unlikely to stand idly by and allow weaker political groups to seize supreme power. They have the ability to choose a favorable moment. They may be able to both absolve themselves of “historical responsibility for illegal actions” and manipulate the composition of the next Chinese power center.
3-9 The Causes of the Instability of China’s “July 1st Mechanism” – PPP Bookstore
As a power mechanism with structural flaws, China’s “July 1st mechanism” is bound to experience a shift in power. The possibility of this shift within the Chinese military includes remaining dormant, drifting towards the Xi Jinping faction, further drifting towards the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies,” and even evolving into a completely independent political force. The overall trend of the Xi Jinping faction is one of continuous decline. In the process of pursuing a safe overall withdrawal, some members may, individually, utilize existing political resources for long-term investments. Of course, theoretically, the possibility of a full-fledged revival for the Xi Jinping faction cannot be ruled out, although the conditions for achieving this political hypothesis are extremely stringent. Compared to the Chinese military and the Xi Jinping faction, internal drift within the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies” will be the primary direction. It’s even possible that the “July 1st mechanism” itself is designed to guide this internal drift. When the power structure of the “July 1st mechanism” shifts, China’s powerful political families will inevitably be drawn into this process.
3-10 The Drifting Prospects of China’s “July 1st Mechanism” – PPP Bookstore
Appendix to Volume 1, Issue 3 of the magazine *Political Forecasting and In-Depth*. Includes: “The Risks of Delayed Unification for Xi Jinping,” “Node 2026: No Time to Postpone,” and “Advertisements Related to Three Groups of Political Forces in China.”
The report, “Node 2026: No Time to Delay,” was publicly released on February 27, 2025. It predicted that if the Xi Jinping faction delayed initiating unified action in China, it would expose Xi Jinping himself, his political group, and his family to significant political risks.
“The Risks of Delaying Unification for Xi Jinping” was circulated internally in a small, confidential manner on March 19, 2025, and officially released on September 20, 2025. It specifically hypothesized the impact of delaying unification on Xi Jinping and his group. In reality, subsequent events did not coincide with these hypothetical scenarios in detail. However, predicting the risks to Xi Jinping at the height of his political power is a valuable lesson to learn from.
The advertisement, titled “Advertisements Related to Three Political Forces in China,” was first released in February 2026. (This prediction indicates that all three political forces in China are at risk; none are completely dead, and none are completely safe.)
3-11 Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis, Part 3 (Appendix) – PPP Bookstore
The third issue of “Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis” mainly discusses China’s “July 1st Mechanism” and China’s reunification.
This issue of the journal contains two articles about the US-China summit. Although both are published in the same issue, these two closely related articles were actually first published a month apart. The article, first published in April 2026, predicts that the US, by simply arranging a US-China summit, will postpone China’s unification process by approximately four years. The article, first published in May, confirms the former prediction. It confirms that Chinese politicians, for their own benefit, have betrayed China’s national interests by agreeing not to initiate the unification process during Xi Jinping’s term. Worse still for China, the unification process has already been effectively postponed until after 2029. This will be a strategic defeat for China. Unless China produces another strong politician with political maneuvering abilities comparable to Xi Jinping, this defeat cannot be reversed.
Another major section of this issue discusses the event announced by China on July 1, 2025. It focuses on the nature of this event, its causes, structural instability, and possible drift directions.
In the philosophy section, two articles were published discussing the philosophical definition and value of war. Although there are only two articles, they are expected to spark a series of debates.
Purchase link: https://bookstore.pppnet.net/zh/downloads/journal-v1t3-aug2026/