3-1 Delaying China’s Reunification: The United States Wins a Key Battle

Beyond the “effective range” advantage of China’s strategic weapons, its operational-level weapons also possess a reliable “effective range” advantage compared to the United States. This gives China a de facto battlefield advantage in all levels of conventional warfare. This advantage is overwhelming, especially when China pursues a “defensive-offensive strategy.” [Note 2: Even with China’s substantial investment in developing its aircraft carrier battle groups, their role in a Sino-US conflict in East Asia will primarily manifest as battlefield isolation or theater deterrence. In a “defensive theater” in East Asia, China’s winning force will be theater-wide medium-range missiles. In an “offensive theater” in Taiwan, China’s winning force will be short-range missiles, battlefield drones, and battlefield robots. In a “defensive theater” targeting Europe’s overall involvement in the East Asian theater, China’s winning weapon is the strategy of “creating chaos in Europe and defeating the enemy outside the defensive zone.” The real bottom line ensuring China’s survival is possessing 3,500 nuclear warheads and demonstrating to the people of North America and Europe its resolve to use them.] This is China’s ability to “preemptively eliminate the option of nuclear war”.

This is a prediction of Hong Kong’s future made by Ye Qiquan in 2014. He also made a similar prediction in 2003. These predictions, considered “absurd and idiotic” at the time, were finally validated in 2020. Since 2003, Hong Kong people have gained considerable short-term political benefits from the central government through large-scale political demonstrations. These benefits have encouraged the inertia and enthusiasm of Hong Kong people in organizing large-scale demonstrations. However, these actions have seriously damaged Hong Kong’s political and economic prospects. Hong Kong’s political and economic decline is inevitable. The probability of Hong Kong continuing under “two systems” or “autonomy” after 2047 is close to zero. The probability of Hong Kong being divided into three or more parts by 2047 is close to 100%. Stubborn or hardline anti-central government forces will face “inconsistent treatment.”

This is the preface and table of contents for the inaugural issue of the quarterly journal *Political Forecasting and In-Depth Studies*. The reason for including a “Review of the Hong Kong Issue” in the inaugural issue is to demonstrate a point by reviewing political predictions that have been proven by history: that is, given the right perspective and analytical methods, an individual’s power can overcome a powerful state apparatus—including superpowers like the United States and the United Kingdom.

As a power mechanism with structural flaws, China’s “July 1st mechanism” is bound to experience a shift in power. The possibilities for this shift within the Chinese military include remaining dormant, shifting towards the Xi Jinping faction, further shifting towards the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies,” and even evolving into a completely independent political force. The overall trend for the Xi Jinping faction is a continuous decline. Some members may escape unfavorable situations individually. Theoretically, the possibility of a full-fledged resurgence of the Xi Jinping faction cannot be ruled out. Internal shifts within the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies” will be the primary direction. When this power structure shift occurs, powerful political families in China will inevitably be drawn into the process.

China’s moderate elites completely subscribe to Western assessment systems when evaluating the nation’s overall strength, overall war capability, and overall competitiveness. This leads them to unanimously oppose China’s plan to unify Taiwan by force. Their opposition is based on their fears, primarily embodied in the following pillars. However, Ye Qiquan’s views are completely opposite. Ye Qiquan believes that China’s overall national war capability will have surpassed that of the United States by 2022; Japan and South Korea, while initially inevitable participants in a Sino-US war, will inevitably join China’s camp in the later stages; forceful unification is a shortcut to rapidly establishing a new East Asian order; the new East Asian order is the cornerstone of the Sino-Asian empire; the new East Asian order is the cornerstone that forces the United States to choose the “North American-East Asian axis”; the establishment of the next generation of world order will inevitably involve a period of chaos; the Taiwan base, the new East Asian order, and China’s forceful unification action are key to shortening this period of chaos; compared to other options, the “North American-East Asian axis” is more readily accepted by the Americans.

This issue primarily discusses China’s “July 1st Mechanism” and Chinese reunification. The United States, by arranging a summit between the two countries’ leaders, has postponed China’s reunification process. This is a significant victory. It also discusses China’s announcement on July 1, 2025, regarding the “transfer of final political decision-making power,” naming this “irregular power transfer” process the “July 1st Mechanism.” The reasons for this power transfer, its structural flaws, and the prospects for power drift are also discussed.