3-2: The US wins another game; Chinese politicians offer a letter of surrender.

As a power mechanism with structural flaws, China’s “July 1st mechanism” is bound to experience a shift in power. The possibilities for this shift within the Chinese military include remaining dormant, shifting towards the Xi Jinping faction, further shifting towards the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies,” and even evolving into a completely independent political force. The overall trend for the Xi Jinping faction is a continuous decline. Some members may escape unfavorable situations individually. Theoretically, the possibility of a full-fledged resurgence of the Xi Jinping faction cannot be ruled out. Internal shifts within the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies” will be the primary direction. When this power structure shift occurs, powerful political families in China will inevitably be drawn into the process.

In fact, Xi Jinping’s political life is over. Political summaries of Xi will revolve around China’s reunification. If China ultimately achieves reunification, the historical conclusion regarding Xi will be largely friendly and moderate, because he stabilized the political situation in Northwest China. He is also a hero for correcting the political trajectory of Hong Kong. However, if China ultimately loses the opportunity for reunification, then Xi Jinping will become a historical sinner and a traitor, because he squandered the historical window of opportunity for China to achieve reunification in 2026.

Given years of pro-independence maneuvering, it’s reasonable to expect Taiwanese people to resent “one country, two systems.” They have also been misled into believing that mainland China is imposing “one country, two systems” on them. However, the reality is quite the opposite. Due to the negative effects of the Hong Kong “one country, two systems” model and the backlash against mainlanders in Taiwan, “one country, two systems” is widely labeled as treasonous by mainland citizens. Because the Taiwanese government’s frequent manipulation of the pro-independence issue in recent years has angered the mainland central government, the mainland officially stripped Taiwan of its substantive political space under “one country, two systems” in August 2022. Furthermore, “one country, two systems” harms China’s geopolitical interests, leaves a window for foreign interference in China’s internal affairs, hinders national integration, slows down China’s historical progress, and sows the seeds for future secession. These are the reasons why the central government refuses to grant Taiwan “one country, two systems.”

Ye Qiquan harshly criticizes the greed, shortsightedness, and stupidity of Hong Kong people. The article cites evidence from multiple sources to prove that the central government is unlikely to grant Hong Kong people the right to “universal suffrage” or “genuine universal suffrage.” Doing so would be tantamount to handing over Hong Kong’s ownership to a group of people completely lacking in political understanding. It would also be equivalent to handing Hong Kong back to the British again, without compensation and completely. Ye Qiquan predicts that the Chinese central government is not only unlikely to agree to grant Hong Kong people more power, but on the contrary, it will have to reclaim some of the powers previously granted to Hong Kong people. Furthermore, if Hong Kong people maintain their inertia of confrontation with the central government, it will seriously affect Hong Kong’s political prospects after 2047.

On July 1, 2025, China announced that the “final political decision-making power” had been completely transferred from the Xi Jinping group to the newly established “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” This mechanism had a fatal flaw from its inception: neither the “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body” nor the “Chinese military” received sufficient “legacy” protection within it. This flaw could not guarantee that the politically dominant party could smoothly maintain its political advantage. Their political opponents, on the other hand, could fully utilize this “legacy” to achieve a complete resurgence or even a partial victory.

In Hong Kong, whether they are radicals, moderates, or even the pro-establishment camp, they are all powerful local political forces. They are all adept at continuously extracting excessive political and economic benefits from the central government of China.