A19 – The risk of China’s reunification by force is manageable.

In Hong Kong, whether they are radicals, moderates, or even the pro-establishment camp, they are all powerful local political forces. They are all adept at continuously extracting excessive political and economic benefits from the central government of China.

Given years of pro-independence maneuvering, it’s reasonable to expect Taiwanese people to resent “one country, two systems.” They have also been misled into believing that mainland China is imposing “one country, two systems” on them. However, the reality is quite the opposite. Due to the negative effects of the Hong Kong “one country, two systems” model and the backlash against mainlanders in Taiwan, “one country, two systems” is widely labeled as treasonous by mainland citizens. Because the Taiwanese government’s frequent manipulation of the pro-independence issue in recent years has angered the mainland central government, the mainland officially stripped Taiwan of its substantive political space under “one country, two systems” in August 2022. Furthermore, “one country, two systems” harms China’s geopolitical interests, leaves a window for foreign interference in China’s internal affairs, hinders national integration, slows down China’s historical progress, and sows the seeds for future secession. These are the reasons why the central government refuses to grant Taiwan “one country, two systems.”

Appendix to Volume 1, Issue 3 of the magazine *Political Forecasting and In-Depth*. Includes: “The Risks of Delaying Unification for Xi Jinping” (This forecast was initially published on March 19, 2025, and officially released on September 20, 2025. Prior to release, it circulated internally as a confidential document); “Node 2026: No Time to Delay” (This forecast indicates that delaying the start of unification would pose significant political risks to Xi Jinping, his group, and his family); and “Advertisements Related to Three Groups of Political Forces in China” (This forecast identifies risks associated with all three political forces in China).

Ye Qiquan believes that the establishment and maintenance of the Israeli state depend on four pillars: geostrategic needs; geostrategic values; the overall competitiveness of the nation or state; and philosophical values. Perhaps in a new era, all four pillars may face challenges.

This is the most comprehensive and in-depth collection of documents to date studying China’s “July 1st Mechanism.” China will issue a notice on July 1, 2025, announcing the establishment of a “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” This is essentially a notice of a transfer of power execution procedures in China. From this day forward, the execution procedures of China’s highest power will enter a new system. The final decision-making power in this new system has been transferred from the Xi Jinping group to the “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body” created by the “July 1st Mechanism.” However, the construction of this power mechanism has structural flaws. These structural flaws mean that none of the three parties involved are completely victorious or completely defeated. None of them have completely won or completely perished. The possibility of one party suddenly being completely resurrected or another suddenly being completely destroyed cannot be ruled out.

Ye Qiquan harshly criticizes the greed, shortsightedness, and stupidity of Hong Kong people. The article cites evidence from multiple sources to prove that the central government is unlikely to grant Hong Kong people the right to “universal suffrage” or “genuine universal suffrage.” Doing so would be tantamount to handing over Hong Kong’s ownership to a group of people completely lacking in political understanding. It would also be equivalent to handing Hong Kong back to the British again, without compensation and completely. Ye Qiquan predicts that the Chinese central government is not only unlikely to agree to grant Hong Kong people more power, but on the contrary, it will have to reclaim some of the powers previously granted to Hong Kong people. Furthermore, if Hong Kong people maintain their inertia of confrontation with the central government, it will seriously affect Hong Kong’s political prospects after 2047.