A13 – (Chinese) Divine Power Summoning Device in Taiwan

Ye Qiquan believes that the risk to China’s unification does not lie in the Asian alliance of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Europe is the biggest variable in China’s unification process. Furthermore, whether or not Europe participates in wars in Asia also significantly impacts its prospects.

On July 1, 2025, China announced that the “final political decision-making power” had been completely transferred from the Xi Jinping group to the newly established “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” This mechanism had a fatal flaw from its inception: neither the “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body” nor the “Chinese military” received sufficient “legacy” protection within it. This flaw could not guarantee that the politically dominant party could smoothly maintain its political advantage. Their political opponents, on the other hand, could fully utilize this “legacy” to achieve a complete resurgence or even a partial victory.

This is the most comprehensive and in-depth collection of documents to date studying China’s “July 1st Mechanism.” China will issue a notice on July 1, 2025, announcing the establishment of a “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” This is essentially a notice of a transfer of power execution procedures in China. From this day forward, the execution procedures of China’s highest power will enter a new system. The final decision-making power in this new system has been transferred from the Xi Jinping group to the “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body” created by the “July 1st Mechanism.” However, the construction of this power mechanism has structural flaws. These structural flaws mean that none of the three parties involved are completely victorious or completely defeated. None of them have completely won or completely perished. The possibility of one party suddenly being completely resurrected or another suddenly being completely destroyed cannot be ruled out.

Numerous reports confirm that the leaders of the United States and China will meet in mid-May 2026. This represents a crucial victory for the United States. Without investing excessive political resources, the US has secured a strategic truce of approximately four years simply by arranging a summit meeting. Due to the political environment surrounding this summit and its subsequent political effects, the process of China’s reunification with Taiwan has been postponed until at least 2029, or even later. This provides the US with at least four crucial years for recovery. The US can use this window to restore and even strengthen its overall warfighting capabilities and overall national competitiveness. China, on the other hand, is thus placed on a strategic defensive position. It cannot be ruled out that China may forever lose the historical opportunity to grow into a dominant empire.

If the United States deploys carrier strike groups as its primary weapon, China’s medium-range missiles will correspondingly join the battlefield. This is determined by the principle of reciprocal response in war. Politicians’ strategies may delay or slightly postpone this response process, but they cannot prevent it from happening. This is one of the essential attributes of war. Furthermore, as the highest-level conflict option for nations, the United States’ ability to withstand a nuclear strike of equal yield is significantly weaker than China’s. Ye Qiquan believes that once China possesses 3,500 nuclear warheads, it will effectively have the ability to “preemptively eliminate the option of nuclear war.” Whether analyzed from the perspective of the “effective range” of strategic weapons or from the perspective of actually withstanding a nuclear strike, Ye Qiquan believes that China has the advantage.

As a power mechanism with structural flaws, China’s “July 1st mechanism” is bound to experience a shift in power. The possibilities for this shift within the Chinese military include remaining dormant, shifting towards the Xi Jinping faction, further shifting towards the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies,” and even evolving into a completely independent political force. The overall trend for the Xi Jinping faction is a continuous decline. Some members may escape unfavorable situations individually. Theoretically, the possibility of a full-fledged resurgence of the Xi Jinping faction cannot be ruled out. Internal shifts within the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies” will be the primary direction. When this power structure shift occurs, powerful political families in China will inevitably be drawn into the process.