A25 – The Ukraine War: The Conflict Between theories of European Victory and European Defeat

The Ukraine War: A Clash Between Victory and Defeat in Europe

Ye Qiquan, May 7, 2025

Abstract: The war on Ukrainian soil has lasted for over three years. Most people are pessimistic about a near-term end to the war. This is due not only to the disparity in strength but also to ideological differences arising from differing perspectives on the war’s future. Currently, at least two completely opposite outlooks exist: one is the “European victory” theory, and the other is the “European defeat” theory. Both theories have their own supporting arguments. If the “European victory” theory gains widespread acceptance, the Ukrainian war will likely continue for a longer period. If the “European defeat” theory gains wider acceptance, then a de-escalation and contraction of the Ukrainian war will gradually occur.

Discussion: The war in Ukraine has lasted for over three years. A key basis for this protracted conflict is the “European victory” narrative. This narrative supports and encourages the political idealism of European citizens and politicians, thus supporting a strategy of prolonging the war. Conversely, the “European defeat” narrative reminds Europeans to scale down the war and shorten its duration. Currently, the “European victory” narrative is dominant, while the “European defeat” narrative is slowly gaining traction.

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乌克兰战争:欧洲胜利论与欧洲失败论的冲突

 

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