A Russian Perspective on the “New Global Order”
Ye Qiquan (qiquanye@gmail.com) ORCID: 0000-0002-4286-9746 Saturday, October 25, 2025
summary:
A war has effectively divided Russia into the “new political power bloc.” A “political buffer zone” is effectively established, isolating Russia from the development process of Europe. Europe established this buffer zone not only with the immediate goal of weakening Russia, but also with the expectation that it will bring more historical benefits. Moving this buffer zone to a geographical location most favorable to Russia’s long-term national interests will be a long-term national pursuit for Russia. This goal may take 100 years to achieve, or it may be accelerated. Russia and China have a long history of complexities, geopolitical complexities, and significant differences in cultural characteristics. These factors make the two countries wary of each other, hinder each other, and pay corresponding real and historical costs. However, the development priorities and expansion goals of the two countries in the next 100 years will not have major conflicts, which is a historical window for the two countries to cooperate deeply. Encouraging the leaders of the two countries to recognize this background will be the foundation for improving their cooperation, reducing the historical costs for both countries, and accelerating the growth of the “new political power bloc.” This is a difficult but extremely valuable task. After ensuring that Russia has established a secure national border in a favorable position, seeking a comprehensive reconciliation with Europe is also a solution that is in line with Russia’s long-term national interests. Furthermore, although the probability of this happening is extremely low, there is a theoretical possibility that the United States would seek cooperation with Russia to jointly address the challenge posed by China. Compared to cooperation with China, a cooperative approach between Russia and Europe/the United States is more in line with Russian cultural trends, philosophical logic, identity politics, and communication habits.
IV. Discussion and Summary
A nation’s long-term strategy is inevitably closely related to its overall security situation. It is also related to the nation’s realistic ambitions when formulating its national plans. These two points involve one constant and two variables. The constant is the nation’s overall security situation. One of the two variables is the nation’s realistic ambitions. The other variable is “the judgment of the nation’s overall security situation.”
A nation’s overall security situation is both a fact and a constant. However, there is no consensus on the understanding of this constant. One hundred people will produce one hundred different judgments because each person has a different perspective. Ye Qiquan analyzes Russia’s current national security situation from philosophical and historical perspectives, and he arrives at the following basic judgments.
4.1 Russia’s westward security is not only a current priority for Russia, but also a major security issue for Russia over the next 100 years.
4.2 Positioning Russia’s western security border in a geopolitical location that aligns with the country’s long-term interests will be a long-term objective for Russia over the next 100 years. The L1 line will be part of this objective.
4.3 Russia has a historic opportunity to achieve its major historical goals. Russia also has the opportunity to accelerate the achievement of these goals.
4.4 Mutual speculation and understanding of the long-term national goals and priorities of China and Russia are the philosophical and political foundation for these two countries to strengthen cooperation, reduce mutual vigilance, and minimize mutual attrition.
4.5 The 2022 war has formally classified Russia as part of the “Bloc of Emerging Political Forces,” a fact Russia must acknowledge. This forms the philosophical basis for Russia’s full commitment to the collaborative process within the “Bloc of Emerging Political Forces.” Speculating on and confirming China’s expansion priorities and work direction for the next 100 years forms the political basis for Russia’s full commitment to the collaborative process within the “Bloc of Emerging Political Forces.”
4.6 Whether there is a clear belief that Russia will be in a “defensive process” in the next 100 years, and whether it is confirmed that there will be no serious conflict between China and Russia in their national development priorities and work directions in the next 100 years, will be the political basis for China to carry out comprehensive cooperation with Russia.
4.7 Accelerating the work on projects 4.5 and 4.6 would expedite comprehensive cooperation between China and Russia. This cooperation is also the cornerstone for accelerating the development of the “Bloc of Emerging Political Forces.” This cooperation will not only benefit the domestic political situations of both countries but also their standing in the international political arena.
4.8 The relationship between China and Russia is complex, encompassing historical, geopolitical, and cultural clashes. Coordinating cooperation between these two countries and minimizing the historical costs arising from mutual wariness and restraint is essential, but also extremely difficult.
4.9 Achieving complete reconciliation with the European Central Region and establishing a relationship with the United States that aligns with Russia’s long-term national interests are both goals that serve Russia’s long-term national interests. Russia currently faces deep hostility from Europe and the United States, but this does not mean that Russia will forever lose this prospect. The possibility of the United States and the European Union forming a “US-Europe-Russia axis” to counter pressure from China cannot be ruled out.
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