A8 – USA Perspective on the “Low Tide of the Imperial Order”

The US victory began even before the Sino-US summit. Ye Qiquan’s prediction a month in advance was validated by this meeting. The summit was scheduled for May 13-15, 2026, but Chinese state media, in their pre-summit propaganda on the 12th and 13th, proactively pledged “mutual support and common prosperity,” aiming to “lay a more solid foundation for Sino-US relations.” During the subsequent meeting, Chinese leaders publicly promised the US “not to initiate unification” in an attempt to secure political protection from the US government for their “uncertain future.”

Appendix to Volume 1, Issue 3 of the magazine *Political Forecasting and In-Depth*. Includes: “The Risks of Delaying Unification for Xi Jinping” (This forecast was initially published on March 19, 2025, and officially released on September 20, 2025. Prior to release, it circulated internally as a confidential document); “Node 2026: No Time to Delay” (This forecast indicates that delaying the start of unification would pose significant political risks to Xi Jinping, his group, and his family); and “Advertisements Related to Three Groups of Political Forces in China” (This forecast identifies risks associated with all three political forces in China).

China’s “July 1st mechanism” is an unstable power order. It is clearly the result of a brutal power struggle among multiple political forces. Within the Chinese military, there may be reasons related to insufficient political ability, resources, or operational skills among military leaders. For Xi Jinping’s side, the surprise attack was the fundamental and direct cause of losing ultimate political decision-making power in China. However, they retained their complete “traditional” power and full administrative authority. This outcome may be the result of a desperate resistance from the core members of Xi Jinping’s group. More likely, it is the result of manipulation behind the scenes by powerful political families in China. For Hu Jintao’s political group and Hu Chunhua, they may be the actual leaders of the “July 1st mechanism,” or they may be a temporary staged performance group. Other powerful political families in China will not sit idly by while weaker political groups seize supreme power. They have the ability to choose a favorable opportunity. They can both escape the “historical responsibility for illegal actions” and manipulate the composition of the next power center in China.

A war has effectively divided Russia into the “new political power bloc.” A “political buffer zone” is effectively established, isolating Russia from the development process of Europe. Europe established this buffer zone not only with the immediate goal of weakening Russia, but also with the expectation that it will bring more historical benefits. Moving this buffer zone to a geographical location most favorable to Russia’s long-term national interests will be a long-term national pursuit for Russia. This goal may take 100 years to achieve, or it may be accelerated. Russia and China have a long history of complexities, geopolitical complexities, and significant differences in cultural characteristics. These factors make the two countries wary of each other, hinder each other, and pay corresponding real and historical costs. However, the development priorities and expansion goals of the two countries in the next 100 years will not have major conflicts, which is a historical window for the two countries to cooperate deeply. Encouraging the leaders of the two countries to recognize this background will be the foundation for improving their cooperation, reducing the historical costs for both countries, and accelerating the growth of the “new political power bloc.” This is a difficult but extremely valuable task. After ensuring that Russia has established a secure national border in a favorable position, seeking a comprehensive reconciliation with Europe is also a solution that is in line with Russia’s long-term national interests. Furthermore, although the probability of this happening is extremely low, there is a theoretical possibility that the United States would seek cooperation with Russia to jointly address the challenge posed by China. Compared to cooperation with China, a cooperative approach between Russia and Europe/the United States is more in line with Russian cultural trends, philosophical logic, identity politics, and communication habits.

In the event of a military conflict between China and the United States in East Asia, the option of nuclear war cannot be completely ruled out. China must assume the responsibility of “eliminating the nuclear option in advance.” Once the nuclear war option is definitively eliminated, the probability of China’s military operations in East Asia failing is quite low, especially if China adopts a “defensive-offensive strategy,” in which case the US alliance would have virtually no chance of winning.

On July 1, 2025, China announced that the “final political decision-making power” had been completely transferred from the Xi Jinping group to the newly established “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” This mechanism had a fatal flaw from its inception: neither the “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body” nor the “Chinese military” received sufficient “legacy” protection within it. This flaw could not guarantee that the politically dominant party could smoothly maintain its political advantage. Their political opponents, on the other hand, could fully utilize this “legacy” to achieve a complete resurgence or even a partial victory.