A12 – Empire – China’s Inevitable Path

China’s unification action, in terms of military scale, is a small-to-medium-scale military operation. However, in essence, it will become the highest-level political action of this century. It essentially declares China’s formal commencement of building an imperial system akin to the G2, G3, or G4 framework. The United States must retreat from its position of sole global taxation power. When discussing the timing of China’s unification, a series of issues deserve in-depth consideration. If China provides relatively favorable answers to 14 minor issues, then taking action in 2026 is far superior to taking action in 2028 or 2029.

Europeans are optimistic about the war in Ukraine. Their support for prolonging or even escalating the conflict is based on a political assumption: the “European victory theory.” From a practical and short-term perspective, this theory is supported by economic data, political realities, and historical experience. In fact, Europe does hold the initiative on the battlefield. However, from a long-term and geopolitical perspective, the “European defeat theory” may be more accurate. Europe has been divided into two parts by this war, leading to a significant weakening of its geopolitical power, a loss of political prestige and moral reputation, and a prolonged period of mutual attrition between the two opposing parts. China’s shift from supporting a strong Europe to weakening it has also contributed to this situation. Some firmly believe that since 2022, Europe has officially entered a potentially 200-year period of decline. During this period, political chaos in Europe will gradually intensify, with European countries not only engaging in external wars but also initiating internal conflicts. European cultural confidence and national self-confidence will gradually decline or even be lost. When Europeans can no longer endure this suffering, they will begin the process of finding a new path for Europe. Advancely evolving Europe’s philosophical logic will be a good way to shorten this decline. Only after Europe has evolved its underlying philosophical logic will they stop relentlessly suppressing the occasional political geniuses who can save Europe.

During any action against Taiwan, China would encounter virtually no external resistance. Even in the aftermath, China could remain invincible by adhering to three key principles: preventing Europe from joining the war or destroying Europe as a base for attrition warfare; using medium-range missiles as the primary means of warfare, employing a defensive-offensive strategy to repel the armed forces of the US-led coalition; completely expelling the US military and political presence in East Asia; and ensuring the ability to preemptively eliminate the option of nuclear war. Considering this from multiple dimensions and perspectives, unifying Taiwan would not pose a significant risk to China. The risk is practically controllable, even minimal. At least during the process of landing on Taiwan, no major risks would arise.

This issue primarily discusses China’s “July 1st Mechanism” and Chinese reunification. The United States, by arranging a summit between the two countries’ leaders, has postponed China’s reunification process. This is a significant victory. It also discusses China’s announcement on July 1, 2025, regarding the “transfer of final political decision-making power,” naming this “irregular power transfer” process the “July 1st Mechanism.” The reasons for this power transfer, its structural flaws, and the prospects for power drift are also discussed.

This is the preface and table of contents for the inaugural issue of the quarterly journal *Political Forecasting and In-Depth Studies*. The reason for including a “Review of the Hong Kong Issue” in the inaugural issue is to demonstrate a point by reviewing political predictions that have been proven by history: that is, given the right perspective and analytical methods, an individual’s power can overcome a powerful state apparatus—including superpowers like the United States and the United Kingdom.

A war has effectively divided Russia into the “new political power bloc.” A “political buffer zone” is effectively established, isolating Russia from the development process of Europe. Europe established this buffer zone not only with the immediate goal of weakening Russia, but also with the expectation that it will bring more historical benefits. Moving this buffer zone to a geographical location most favorable to Russia’s long-term national interests will be a long-term national pursuit for Russia. This goal may take 100 years to achieve, or it may be accelerated. Russia and China have a long history of complexities, geopolitical complexities, and significant differences in cultural characteristics. These factors make the two countries wary of each other, hinder each other, and pay corresponding real and historical costs. However, the development priorities and expansion goals of the two countries in the next 100 years will not have major conflicts, which is a historical window for the two countries to cooperate deeply. Encouraging the leaders of the two countries to recognize this background will be the foundation for improving their cooperation, reducing the historical costs for both countries, and accelerating the growth of the “new political power bloc.” This is a difficult but extremely valuable task. After ensuring that Russia has established a secure national border in a favorable position, seeking a comprehensive reconciliation with Europe is also a solution that is in line with Russia’s long-term national interests. Furthermore, although the probability of this happening is extremely low, there is a theoretical possibility that the United States would seek cooperation with Russia to jointly address the challenge posed by China. Compared to cooperation with China, a cooperative approach between Russia and Europe/the United States is more in line with Russian cultural trends, philosophical logic, identity politics, and communication habits.