A19 – The risk of China’s reunification by force is manageable.

China’s moderate elites completely subscribe to Western assessment systems when evaluating the nation’s overall strength, overall war capability, and overall competitiveness. This leads them to unanimously oppose China’s plan to unify Taiwan by force. Their opposition is based on their fears, primarily embodied in the following pillars. However, Ye Qiquan’s views are completely opposite. Ye Qiquan believes that China’s overall national war capability will have surpassed that of the United States by 2022; Japan and South Korea, while initially inevitable participants in a Sino-US war, will inevitably join China’s camp in the later stages; forceful unification is a shortcut to rapidly establishing a new East Asian order; the new East Asian order is the cornerstone of the Sino-Asian empire; the new East Asian order is the cornerstone that forces the United States to choose the “North American-East Asian axis”; the establishment of the next generation of world order will inevitably involve a period of chaos; the Taiwan base, the new East Asian order, and China’s forceful unification action are key to shortening this period of chaos; compared to other options, the “North American-East Asian axis” is more readily accepted by the Americans.

China’s unification action, in terms of military scale, is a small-to-medium-scale military operation. However, in essence, it will become the highest-level political action of this century. It essentially declares China’s formal commencement of building an imperial system akin to the G2, G3, or G4 framework. The United States must retreat from its position of sole global taxation power. When discussing the timing of China’s unification, a series of issues deserve in-depth consideration. If China provides relatively favorable answers to 14 minor issues, then taking action in 2026 is far superior to taking action in 2028 or 2029.

This issue primarily discusses China’s “July 1st Mechanism” and Chinese reunification. The United States, by arranging a summit between the two countries’ leaders, has postponed China’s reunification process. This is a significant victory. It also discusses China’s announcement on July 1, 2025, regarding the “transfer of final political decision-making power,” naming this “irregular power transfer” process the “July 1st Mechanism.” The reasons for this power transfer, its structural flaws, and the prospects for power drift are also discussed.

A war has effectively divided Russia into the “new political power bloc.” A “political buffer zone” is effectively established, isolating Russia from the development process of Europe. Europe established this buffer zone not only with the immediate goal of weakening Russia, but also with the expectation that it will bring more historical benefits. Moving this buffer zone to a geographical location most favorable to Russia’s long-term national interests will be a long-term national pursuit for Russia. This goal may take 100 years to achieve, or it may be accelerated. Russia and China have a long history of complexities, geopolitical complexities, and significant differences in cultural characteristics. These factors make the two countries wary of each other, hinder each other, and pay corresponding real and historical costs. However, the development priorities and expansion goals of the two countries in the next 100 years will not have major conflicts, which is a historical window for the two countries to cooperate deeply. Encouraging the leaders of the two countries to recognize this background will be the foundation for improving their cooperation, reducing the historical costs for both countries, and accelerating the growth of the “new political power bloc.” This is a difficult but extremely valuable task. After ensuring that Russia has established a secure national border in a favorable position, seeking a comprehensive reconciliation with Europe is also a solution that is in line with Russia’s long-term national interests. Furthermore, although the probability of this happening is extremely low, there is a theoretical possibility that the United States would seek cooperation with Russia to jointly address the challenge posed by China. Compared to cooperation with China, a cooperative approach between Russia and Europe/the United States is more in line with Russian cultural trends, philosophical logic, identity politics, and communication habits.

Europeans are optimistic about the war in Ukraine. Their support for prolonging or even escalating the conflict is based on a political assumption: the “European victory theory.” From a practical and short-term perspective, this theory is supported by economic data, political realities, and historical experience. In fact, Europe does hold the initiative on the battlefield. However, from a long-term and geopolitical perspective, the “European defeat theory” may be more accurate. Europe has been divided into two parts by this war, leading to a significant weakening of its geopolitical power, a loss of political prestige and moral reputation, and a prolonged period of mutual attrition between the two opposing parts. China’s shift from supporting a strong Europe to weakening it has also contributed to this situation. Some firmly believe that since 2022, Europe has officially entered a potentially 200-year period of decline. During this period, political chaos in Europe will gradually intensify, with European countries not only engaging in external wars but also initiating internal conflicts. European cultural confidence and national self-confidence will gradually decline or even be lost. When Europeans can no longer endure this suffering, they will begin the process of finding a new path for Europe. Advancely evolving Europe’s philosophical logic will be a good way to shorten this decline. Only after Europe has evolved its underlying philosophical logic will they stop relentlessly suppressing the occasional political geniuses who can save Europe.

This is a political prediction made in 2003. It predicted the political failure of the British people 17 years in advance. The British are adept at seizing opportunities to pursue short-term gains. In the early days of the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao administration, they employed complex political maneuvering to play a new game of…