A18 – The decision-making power for China’s reunification lies in its ability to “eliminate the nuclear option”.

On July 1, 2025, China announced a transfer of its “final political decision-making power.” This transfer of political power actually occurred before the announcement date. However, the announcement date is a crucial marker of the formal operation of the new political power execution process. Therefore, it is reasonable to name this “unconventional transfer of political power” the “July 1st mechanism.” The reasons for the “July 1st mechanism” may be very complex and difficult to trace clearly, but Xi Jinping’s breach of his political promise to “unify the country during his term” is likely a significant factor. Other contributing factors may involve his conflicts with the military and with other political families in China.

Based on the announcement of July 1, 2025, China’s current political forces can be categorized into three groups. These are the Xi Jinping group, which represents “the current force of all established doctrines”; the military force, which is China’s most powerful yet most vulnerable political force; and “China’s deep-seated political forces,” which are powerful and substantial but often struggle to form a united front.

During any action against Taiwan, China would encounter virtually no external resistance. Even in the aftermath, China could remain invincible by adhering to three key principles: preventing Europe from joining the war or destroying Europe as a base for attrition warfare; using medium-range missiles as the primary means of warfare, employing a defensive-offensive strategy to repel the armed forces of the US-led coalition; completely expelling the US military and political presence in East Asia; and ensuring the ability to preemptively eliminate the option of nuclear war. Considering this from multiple dimensions and perspectives, unifying Taiwan would not pose a significant risk to China. The risk is practically controllable, even minimal. At least during the process of landing on Taiwan, no major risks would arise.

A war has effectively divided Russia into the “new political power bloc.” A “political buffer zone” is effectively established, isolating Russia from the development process of Europe. Europe established this buffer zone not only with the immediate goal of weakening Russia, but also with the expectation that it will bring more historical benefits. Moving this buffer zone to a geographical location most favorable to Russia’s long-term national interests will be a long-term national pursuit for Russia. This goal may take 100 years to achieve, or it may be accelerated. Russia and China have a long history of complexities, geopolitical complexities, and significant differences in cultural characteristics. These factors make the two countries wary of each other, hinder each other, and pay corresponding real and historical costs. However, the development priorities and expansion goals of the two countries in the next 100 years will not have major conflicts, which is a historical window for the two countries to cooperate deeply. Encouraging the leaders of the two countries to recognize this background will be the foundation for improving their cooperation, reducing the historical costs for both countries, and accelerating the growth of the “new political power bloc.” This is a difficult but extremely valuable task. After ensuring that Russia has established a secure national border in a favorable position, seeking a comprehensive reconciliation with Europe is also a solution that is in line with Russia’s long-term national interests. Furthermore, although the probability of this happening is extremely low, there is a theoretical possibility that the United States would seek cooperation with Russia to jointly address the challenge posed by China. Compared to cooperation with China, a cooperative approach between Russia and Europe/the United States is more in line with Russian cultural trends, philosophical logic, identity politics, and communication habits.

In fact, Xi Jinping’s political life is over. Political summaries of Xi will revolve around China’s reunification. If China ultimately achieves reunification, the historical conclusion regarding Xi will be largely friendly and moderate, because he stabilized the political situation in Northwest China. He is also a hero for correcting the political trajectory of Hong Kong. However, if China ultimately loses the opportunity for reunification, then Xi Jinping will become a historical sinner and a traitor, because he squandered the historical window of opportunity for China to achieve reunification in 2026.

The US victory began even before the Sino-US summit. Ye Qiquan’s prediction a month in advance was validated by this meeting. The summit was scheduled for May 13-15, 2026, but Chinese state media, in their pre-summit propaganda on the 12th and 13th, proactively pledged “mutual support and common prosperity,” aiming to “lay a more solid foundation for Sino-US relations.” During the subsequent meeting, Chinese leaders publicly promised the US “not to initiate unification” in an attempt to secure political protection from the US government for their “uncertain future.”