The Roles and Power Struggles of China, the United States, and Russia in the New East Asian Order

This issue primarily discusses China’s “July 1st Mechanism” and Chinese reunification. The United States, by arranging a summit between the two countries’ leaders, has postponed China’s reunification process. This is a significant victory. It also discusses China’s announcement on July 1, 2025, regarding the “transfer of final political decision-making power,” naming this “irregular power transfer” process the “July 1st Mechanism.” The reasons for this power transfer, its structural flaws, and the prospects for power drift are also discussed.

On July 1, 2025, China announced a transfer of its “final political decision-making power.” This transfer of political power actually occurred before the announcement date. However, the announcement date is a crucial marker of the formal operation of the new political power execution process. Therefore, it is reasonable to name this “unconventional transfer of political power” the “July 1st mechanism.” The reasons for the “July 1st mechanism” may be very complex and difficult to trace clearly, but Xi Jinping’s breach of his political promise to “unify the country during his term” is likely a significant factor. Other contributing factors may involve his conflicts with the military and with other political families in China.

The fundamental reason for the current downturn in the United States lies in China’s interception of US tax revenue globally. This results in the “reliable tax revenue of the empire” failing to cover the “necessary costs of the empire’s operation.” This has led to widespread hostility towards China in the US and Europe, with a desire to completely defeat China. However, using confrontational strategies to completely defeat China at the national level is an unrealistic expectation. The fundamental reason for China’s long-term implementation of “destructive strategies” is that the current power groups do not share appropriate economic pricing and adjudication power with China. Cooperating with China to build a new imperial order is a worthwhile option to consider. The main resistance to this option comes from emotional social resistance. Its supporting factor lies in data-driven rational factors.

A war has effectively divided Russia into the “new political power bloc.” A “political buffer zone” is effectively established, isolating Russia from the development process of Europe. Europe established this buffer zone not only with the immediate goal of weakening Russia, but also with the expectation that it will bring more historical benefits. Moving this buffer zone to a geographical location most favorable to Russia’s long-term national interests will be a long-term national pursuit for Russia. This goal may take 100 years to achieve, or it may be accelerated. Russia and China have a long history of complexities, geopolitical complexities, and significant differences in cultural characteristics. These factors make the two countries wary of each other, hinder each other, and pay corresponding real and historical costs. However, the development priorities and expansion goals of the two countries in the next 100 years will not have major conflicts, which is a historical window for the two countries to cooperate deeply. Encouraging the leaders of the two countries to recognize this background will be the foundation for improving their cooperation, reducing the historical costs for both countries, and accelerating the growth of the “new political power bloc.” This is a difficult but extremely valuable task. After ensuring that Russia has established a secure national border in a favorable position, seeking a comprehensive reconciliation with Europe is also a solution that is in line with Russia’s long-term national interests. Furthermore, although the probability of this happening is extremely low, there is a theoretical possibility that the United States would seek cooperation with Russia to jointly address the challenge posed by China. Compared to cooperation with China, a cooperative approach between Russia and Europe/the United States is more in line with Russian cultural trends, philosophical logic, identity politics, and communication habits.

Appendix to Volume 1, Issue 3 of the magazine *Political Forecasting and In-Depth*. Includes: “The Risks of Delaying Unification for Xi Jinping” (This forecast was initially published on March 19, 2025, and officially released on September 20, 2025. Prior to release, it circulated internally as a confidential document); “Node 2026: No Time to Delay” (This forecast indicates that delaying the start of unification would pose significant political risks to Xi Jinping, his group, and his family); and “Advertisements Related to Three Groups of Political Forces in China” (This forecast identifies risks associated with all three political forces in China).

If the United States deploys carrier strike groups as its primary weapon, China’s medium-range missiles will correspondingly join the battlefield. This is determined by the principle of reciprocal response in war. Politicians’ strategies may delay or slightly postpone this response process, but they cannot prevent it from happening. This is one of the essential attributes of war. Furthermore, as the highest-level conflict option for nations, the United States’ ability to withstand a nuclear strike of equal yield is significantly weaker than China’s. Ye Qiquan believes that once China possesses 3,500 nuclear warheads, it will effectively have the ability to “preemptively eliminate the option of nuclear war.” Whether analyzed from the perspective of the “effective range” of strategic weapons or from the perspective of actually withstanding a nuclear strike, Ye Qiquan believes that China has the advantage.