3-2: The US wins another game; Chinese politicians offer a letter of surrender.

The US’s advantage began even before the Sino-US summit. A month ago, Ye Qiquan asserted that the US had already gained a four-year period of strategic stability by arranging this meeting. This assertion has now been reaffirmed. The Xi Jinping administration has promised the US that it will not initiate China’s unification process during his term. Although the Sino-US summit is scheduled for May 13-15, 2026, Chinese official media proactively pledged “mutual support and common prosperity” and “laying a more solid foundation for Sino-US relations” in their pre-summit propaganda on the 12th and 13th. During the subsequent summit, Chinese political leaders repeatedly and publicly promised the US “not to initiate unification,” attempting to gain political protection from the US government for the “uncertain future” of these politicians.

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3-2 美国再赢一局:中国政客奉上投降书

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