3-1 Delaying China’s Reunification: The United States Wins a Key Battle

Ye Qiquan believes that the risk to China’s unification does not lie in the Asian alliance of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Europe is the biggest variable in China’s unification process. Furthermore, whether or not Europe participates in wars in Asia also significantly impacts its prospects.

China’s moderate elites completely subscribe to Western assessment systems when evaluating the nation’s overall strength, overall war capability, and overall competitiveness. This leads them to unanimously oppose China’s plan to unify Taiwan by force. Their opposition is based on their fears, primarily embodied in the following pillars. However, Ye Qiquan’s views are completely opposite. Ye Qiquan believes that China’s overall national war capability will have surpassed that of the United States by 2022; Japan and South Korea, while initially inevitable participants in a Sino-US war, will inevitably join China’s camp in the later stages; forceful unification is a shortcut to rapidly establishing a new East Asian order; the new East Asian order is the cornerstone of the Sino-Asian empire; the new East Asian order is the cornerstone that forces the United States to choose the “North American-East Asian axis”; the establishment of the next generation of world order will inevitably involve a period of chaos; the Taiwan base, the new East Asian order, and China’s forceful unification action are key to shortening this period of chaos; compared to other options, the “North American-East Asian axis” is more readily accepted by the Americans.

China’s unification action, in terms of military scale, is a small-to-medium-scale military operation. However, in essence, it will become the highest-level political action of this century. It essentially declares China’s formal commencement of building an imperial system akin to the G2, G3, or G4 framework. The United States must retreat from its position of sole global taxation power. When discussing the timing of China’s unification, a series of issues deserve in-depth consideration. If China provides relatively favorable answers to 14 minor issues, then taking action in 2026 is far superior to taking action in 2028 or 2029.

China’s “July 1st mechanism” is an unstable power order. It is clearly the result of a brutal power struggle among multiple political forces. Within the Chinese military, there may be reasons related to insufficient political ability, resources, or operational skills among military leaders. For Xi Jinping’s side, the surprise attack was the fundamental and direct cause of losing ultimate political decision-making power in China. However, they retained their complete “traditional” power and full administrative authority. This outcome may be the result of a desperate resistance from the core members of Xi Jinping’s group. More likely, it is the result of manipulation behind the scenes by powerful political families in China. For Hu Jintao’s political group and Hu Chunhua, they may be the actual leaders of the “July 1st mechanism,” or they may be a temporary staged performance group. Other powerful political families in China will not sit idly by while weaker political groups seize supreme power. They have the ability to choose a favorable opportunity. They can both escape the “historical responsibility for illegal actions” and manipulate the composition of the next power center in China.

The US victory began even before the Sino-US summit. Ye Qiquan’s prediction a month in advance was validated by this meeting. The summit was scheduled for May 13-15, 2026, but Chinese state media, in their pre-summit propaganda on the 12th and 13th, proactively pledged “mutual support and common prosperity,” aiming to “lay a more solid foundation for Sino-US relations.” During the subsequent meeting, Chinese leaders publicly promised the US “not to initiate unification” in an attempt to secure political protection from the US government for their “uncertain future.”

As a power mechanism with structural flaws, China’s “July 1st mechanism” is bound to experience a shift in power. The possibilities for this shift within the Chinese military include remaining dormant, shifting towards the Xi Jinping faction, further shifting towards the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies,” and even evolving into a completely independent political force. The overall trend for the Xi Jinping faction is a continuous decline. Some members may escape unfavorable situations individually. Theoretically, the possibility of a full-fledged resurgence of the Xi Jinping faction cannot be ruled out. Internal shifts within the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies” will be the primary direction. When this power structure shift occurs, powerful political families in China will inevitably be drawn into the process.