3-9 The Causes of the Instability of China’s “July 1st Mechanism”

China’s “July 1st mechanism” is an unstable power order. The reasons for this instability are difficult to fathom, but it is clearly the result of a brutal power struggle among multiple political forces. Within the Chinese military, there may be insufficient political ability, resources, or operational skills among its leaders, preventing the military from gaining support from powerful political forces. This could be a significant reason why the military lacks the protection of “traditional authority.” For Xi Jinping, the surprise attack was the fundamental and direct cause of losing ultimate political decision-making power in China. However, they retained complete “traditional authority” and full administrative power. This outcome may be the result of a desperate resistance from the core members of Xi Jinping’s group, or more likely, the result of manipulation behind the scenes by powerful political families in China. For Hu Jintao’s political group and Hu Chunhua himself, they are shining political stars during the window of opportunity from April to October 2025. This also means they will be the obvious candidates to bear the “historical responsibility for illegal actions.” Hu Jintao’s group may be the actual leaders of the “July 1st mechanism,” or they may be a temporary performance group. Other powerful political families in China appear to be absent from the “July 1 mechanism,” but they are unlikely to stand idly by and allow weaker political groups to seize supreme power. They have the ability to choose a favorable moment. They may be able to both absolve themselves of “historical responsibility for illegal actions” and manipulate the composition of the next Chinese power center.

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3-9 中国“七月一日机制”的不稳定性溯因

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