3-8 The Structure and Defects of China’s “July 1st Mechanism”

Based on China’s July 1, 2025 announcement mechanism, it can be determined that the Xi Jinping faction is currently the weaker party. The Chinese military is currently the main force stabilizing China’s political situation; however, the military and its leaders have serious deficiencies. Overall, China’s extra-mandate political force is currently the strongest party and holds a general advantage. However, these advantages do not guarantee their complete victory. None of the three parties is currently completely defeated, nor can any party guarantee victory. They all need to find a way out of their predicament.

This is the most comprehensive and in-depth collection of documents to date studying China’s “July 1st Mechanism.” China will issue a notice on July 1, 2025, announcing the establishment of a “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” This is essentially a notice of a transfer of power execution procedures in China. From this day forward, the execution procedures of China’s highest power will enter a new system. The final decision-making power in this new system has been transferred from the Xi Jinping group to the “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body” created by the “July 1st Mechanism.” However, the construction of this power mechanism has structural flaws. These structural flaws mean that none of the three parties involved are completely victorious or completely defeated. None of them have completely won or completely perished. The possibility of one party suddenly being completely resurrected or another suddenly being completely destroyed cannot be ruled out.

This is a prediction of Hong Kong’s future made by Ye Qiquan in 2014. He also made a similar prediction in 2003. These predictions, considered “absurd and idiotic” at the time, were finally validated in 2020. Since 2003, Hong Kong people have gained considerable short-term political benefits from the central government through large-scale political demonstrations. These benefits have encouraged the inertia and enthusiasm of Hong Kong people in organizing large-scale demonstrations. However, these actions have seriously damaged Hong Kong’s political and economic prospects. Hong Kong’s political and economic decline is inevitable. The probability of Hong Kong continuing under “two systems” or “autonomy” after 2047 is close to zero. The probability of Hong Kong being divided into three or more parts by 2047 is close to 100%. Stubborn or hardline anti-central government forces will face “inconsistent treatment.”

Ye Qiquan believes that the risk to China’s unification does not lie in the Asian alliance of the United States, Japan, and South Korea. Europe is the biggest variable in China’s unification process. Furthermore, whether or not Europe participates in wars in Asia also significantly impacts its prospects.

As a power mechanism with structural flaws, China’s “July 1st mechanism” is bound to experience a shift in power. The possibilities for this shift within the Chinese military include remaining dormant, shifting towards the Xi Jinping faction, further shifting towards the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies,” and even evolving into a completely independent political force. The overall trend for the Xi Jinping faction is a continuous decline. Some members may escape unfavorable situations individually. Theoretically, the possibility of a full-fledged resurgence of the Xi Jinping faction cannot be ruled out. Internal shifts within the “Central Committee’s decision-making and coordinating bodies” will be the primary direction. When this power structure shift occurs, powerful political families in China will inevitably be drawn into the process.

China’s “July 1st mechanism” is an unstable power order. It is clearly the result of a brutal power struggle among multiple political forces. Within the Chinese military, there may be reasons related to insufficient political ability, resources, or operational skills among military leaders. For Xi Jinping’s side, the surprise attack was the fundamental and direct cause of losing ultimate political decision-making power in China. However, they retained their complete “traditional” power and full administrative authority. This outcome may be the result of a desperate resistance from the core members of Xi Jinping’s group. More likely, it is the result of manipulation behind the scenes by powerful political families in China. For Hu Jintao’s political group and Hu Chunhua, they may be the actual leaders of the “July 1st mechanism,” or they may be a temporary staged performance group. Other powerful political families in China will not sit idly by while weaker political groups seize supreme power. They have the ability to choose a favorable opportunity. They can both escape the “historical responsibility for illegal actions” and manipulate the composition of the next power center in China.