A25 – The Ukraine War: The Conflict Between theories of European Victory and European Defeat

A political assumption is that the old imperial order, dominated by the United States, relied on four main pillars of power: the North American pillar, the European pillar, the East Asian pillar, and the Israeli pillar. In China’s construction of its imperial structure, the East Asian pillar of the United States is the first to be impacted. The United States must first assess this reality and formulate the best response plan. China has reached a historical juncture in building its imperial structure. Closing its security gaps in the East is crucial to the speed and success of its imperial construction. Its focus is not only on East Asia but also inevitably includes the security of Southeast Asia, the Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean passage. The competition between these two established players and newcomers dominates the process of building a new order in East Asia. However, Russia is not inactive. It may become a key third party, reaping significant unexpected gains in balancing European actions.

This is the preface and table of contents for the inaugural issue of the quarterly journal *Political Forecasting and In-Depth Studies*. The reason for including a “Review of the Hong Kong Issue” in the inaugural issue is to demonstrate a point by reviewing political predictions that have been proven by history: that is, given the right perspective and analytical methods, an individual’s power can overcome a powerful state apparatus—including superpowers like the United States and the United Kingdom.

Beyond the “effective range” advantage of China’s strategic weapons, its operational-level weapons also possess a reliable “effective range” advantage compared to the United States. This gives China a de facto battlefield advantage in all levels of conventional warfare. This advantage is overwhelming, especially when China pursues a “defensive-offensive strategy.” [Note 2: Even with China’s substantial investment in developing its aircraft carrier battle groups, their role in a Sino-US conflict in East Asia will primarily manifest as battlefield isolation or theater deterrence. In a “defensive theater” in East Asia, China’s winning force will be theater-wide medium-range missiles. In an “offensive theater” in Taiwan, China’s winning force will be short-range missiles, battlefield drones, and battlefield robots. In a “defensive theater” targeting Europe’s overall involvement in the East Asian theater, China’s winning weapon is the strategy of “creating chaos in Europe and defeating the enemy outside the defensive zone.” The real bottom line ensuring China’s survival is possessing 3,500 nuclear warheads and demonstrating to the people of North America and Europe its resolve to use them.] This is China’s ability to “preemptively eliminate the option of nuclear war”.

Hong Kong people oppose the completion of the details of Article 23 legislation. However, this is their responsibility as stipulated in the Basic Law of Hong Kong. Legally speaking, it is illegal. They have consistently relied on this illegality to gain political and economic benefits from the central government of China. However, this practice is unsustainable. Ye Qiquan predicts that this political inertia will be halted.

Numerous reports confirm that the leaders of the United States and China will meet in mid-May 2026. This represents a crucial victory for the United States. Without investing excessive political resources, the US has secured a strategic truce of approximately four years simply by arranging a summit meeting. Due to the political environment surrounding this summit and its subsequent political effects, the process of China’s reunification with Taiwan has been postponed until at least 2029, or even later. This provides the US with at least four crucial years for recovery. The US can use this window to restore and even strengthen its overall warfighting capabilities and overall national competitiveness. China, on the other hand, is thus placed on a strategic defensive position. It cannot be ruled out that China may forever lose the historical opportunity to grow into a dominant empire.

Based on China’s July 1, 2025 announcement mechanism, it can be determined that the Xi Jinping faction is currently the weaker party. The Chinese military is currently the main force stabilizing China’s political situation; however, the military and its leaders have serious deficiencies. Overall, China’s extra-mandate political force is currently the strongest party and holds a general advantage. However, these advantages do not guarantee their complete victory. None of the three parties is currently completely defeated, nor can any party guarantee victory. They all need to find a way out of their predicament.