A21 – Concerns about China’s governance of Taiwan

By叶 其泉

Order, “sub-identity,” historical innocence, and governance of Taiwan (Research Outline)

Ye Qiquan’s first public appearance: September 30, 2025

Introduction: The diplomatic quagmire of post-Soviet Russia, the failures of the Soviet Union and the United States in governing Afghanistan, and Armenians’ pursuit of historical debts against Turkey are all key factors that have caused concern among China’s conservative faction regarding the governance of Taiwan. I would like to discuss my understanding of this issue from the perspectives of imperial power, peripheral tendencies, ethnic identity, and historical innocence.

Key Points: I. The “Power Gap” is the Fundamental Factor in Attracting External Forces: The Taiwan Story II. The Foundation of Imperial Order: The “Power Gap” Between the Center and the Periphery III. National Sub-Identity: Damaging China’s Historical Interests IV. Concerns about Historical Innocence 4.1 Pursuing the Return of Hearts and Minds as Quickly as Possible 4.2 The Central Government Must Avoid Bearing Historical Responsibility 4.2.1 Political Firewall 4.2.2 Economic Firewall 4.2.3 Free Movement Firewall 4.2.4 Attraction Firewall

Note 1: This is an attachment to a mass email. Note 2: Ye Qiquan declares that this is a research outline. Any research project using this outline, in whole or in part, as its framework must have a prior cooperation agreement signed, and Ye Qiquan must be listed as the second author in the main paper. Parties who provide clues about infringement and participate in the claims process can share 80% of the final compensation amount.

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中国治理台湾的忧虑点

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