A22 – Calculation of National Overall War Capability

Calculation of National Overall War Capability

First published by Ye Qiquan: December 7, 2023

introduction:

Concerns about a full-scale conflict between China and the US likely form the theoretical basis for the “China prudence faction’s” delay in the unification process. Ye Qiquan is willing to discuss this concern from two perspectives: “the overall war capability of a nation” and “the overall war capability of a war alliance.” (Predictions made under this calculation model that “the war in Ukraine will be fought for a long time between the L1 and L2 lines” and “the war will not end or completely cease by the end of 2026” have been proven true by the more than three years of the war in Ukraine.)

Based on the war of February 24, 2022 (the Russo-Ukrainian War, the Ukraine War, the 2022 European War), Ye Qiquan keenly sensed that the world had entered a new era—an era of competition primarily through armed forces. This war also shattered his previous admiration for politicians. He not only realized that the political wisdom of European politicians might be far below the average level, but more importantly, he recognized the low moral character of European politicians.

Yeh Chi-chuan insists that ” as long as a politician’s starting point is for the sake of his country and nation, whatever he does is in accordance with political morality,” and the opposite is not politically moral. In the preface to his book, *Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impacts, Influences, and Risks*, he states directly that he is not only worried about the political capabilities of European politicians but also about their political morality, which could lead Europe into East Asian conflicts in 2026 or later. This dangerous move would exacerbate global chaos, expand its scope, and prolong its duration. This concern has also prompted him to deeply consider methods for assessing a nation’s overall warfighting capabilities. He believes that existing rankings such as “World Firepower Rankings,” “World Air Force Power Rankings,” “World Innovation Index,” “World Food Dependence Index,” and various other military power rankings are unsuitable for ” assessing a nation’s overall warfighting capabilities.”

Based on the above concerns, Ye Qiquan introduced his calculation system for calculating and evaluating “national overall war power”.

Note 1: This is an attachment from a mass email sent on September 30, 2025. Note 2: The main content was first published on the PPPNET blog on December 7, 2023. It is also part of the book “Unification of Taiwan in 2026: Impacts, Consequences, and Risks,” published in December 2023.

https://bookstore.pppnet.net/zh/downloads/calculating-nation-war-strength/

国家总体战争能力计算

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