The Roles and Power Struggles of China, the United States, and Russia in the New East Asian Order

By叶 其泉

The Roles and Power Struggles of China, the United States, and Russia in the New East Asian Order

(Research Outline/Political Prediction/Political Speculation) Ye Qiquan, September 15, 2025

 

summary:

A political assumption is that the old imperial order, dominated by the United States, relied on four main pillars of power: the North American pillar, the European pillar, the East Asian pillar, and the Israeli pillar. In China’s construction of its imperial structure, the East Asian pillar of the United States is the first to be impacted. The United States must first assess this reality and formulate the best response plan. China has reached a historical juncture in building its imperial structure. Closing its security gaps in the East is crucial to the speed and success of its imperial construction. Its focus is not only on East Asia but also inevitably includes the security of Southeast Asia, the Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean passage. The competition between these two established players and newcomers dominates the process of building a new order in East Asia. However, Russia is not inactive. It may become a key third party, reaping significant unexpected gains in balancing European actions.

summary:

In a historical stage where land-based weapons surpass sea-based weapons in both “range” and “effective range,” the decline of sea power and sea politics is an inevitable historical trend. The rise of land politics will bring the following irreversible historical trends: A. The strategic importance of aircraft carrier battle groups will gradually decline, eventually becoming theater-level weapons. B. The trend of economic globalization will stagnate, while the importance of regional cooperation and regional order will increase. The ability of financial power to manipulate political power will slightly decrease. C. Under the leadership of the Chinese empire, cooperation among regional land power centers will become the main framework of a new global imperial order. Under the impact of these historical trends, the establishment of a new East Asian order is an inevitable historical outcome. In the process of establishing this new East Asian order, the United States and China will be the main variables, with Russia having a high probability of becoming an important variable as well. Although Japan and South Korea are independent political and economic components in the new East Asian order, they have always been passive in its construction. Different interaction schemes among these key participants may trigger different dynamic processes and different outcomes for the new East Asian order.

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中国，美国，俄罗斯在新东亚秩序进程中

 

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