3-3 Political Evaluation of Xi Jinping’s Rule (Ye Qiquan’s Version)

In fact, Xi Jinping’s political life is over. The time has come to give him a political summary. When historians, both now and in the future, summarize Xi Jinping’s political career, the issue of China’s unification will be a central point. If China ultimately achieves unification, then Xi Jinping’s historical conclusion will be largely amicable and moderate. After all, Xi Jinping has made significant contributions to stabilizing the political situation in Northwest China. He is also the hero who corrected the course of Hong Kong’s politics. However, if China ultimately loses the opportunity for unification, then Xi Jinping will become a historical sinner and a traitor, because he has squandered the historical window of opportunity for China to achieve unification in 2026.

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3-3 对习近平执政的政治评价(Ye Qiquan版)

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