3-8 The Structure and Defects of China’s “July 1st Mechanism”

This is the most comprehensive and in-depth collection of documents to date studying China’s “July 1st Mechanism.” China will issue a notice on July 1, 2025, announcing the establishment of a “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” This is essentially a notice of a transfer of power execution procedures in China. From this day forward, the execution procedures of China’s highest power will enter a new system. The final decision-making power in this new system has been transferred from the Xi Jinping group to the “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body” created by the “July 1st Mechanism.” However, the construction of this power mechanism has structural flaws. These structural flaws mean that none of the three parties involved are completely victorious or completely defeated. None of them have completely won or completely perished. The possibility of one party suddenly being completely resurrected or another suddenly being completely destroyed cannot be ruled out.

This is a prediction of Hong Kong’s future made by Ye Qiquan in 2014. He also made a similar prediction in 2003. These predictions, considered “absurd and idiotic” at the time, were finally validated in 2020. Since 2003, Hong Kong people have gained considerable short-term political benefits from the central government through large-scale political demonstrations. These benefits have encouraged the inertia and enthusiasm of Hong Kong people in organizing large-scale demonstrations. However, these actions have seriously damaged Hong Kong’s political and economic prospects. Hong Kong’s political and economic decline is inevitable. The probability of Hong Kong continuing under “two systems” or “autonomy” after 2047 is close to zero. The probability of Hong Kong being divided into three or more parts by 2047 is close to 100%. Stubborn or hardline anti-central government forces will face “inconsistent treatment.”

Numerous reports confirm that the leaders of the United States and China will meet in mid-May 2026. This represents a crucial victory for the United States. Without investing excessive political resources, the US has secured a strategic truce of approximately four years simply by arranging a summit meeting. Due to the political environment surrounding this summit and its subsequent political effects, the process of China’s reunification with Taiwan has been postponed until at least 2029, or even later. This provides the US with at least four crucial years for recovery. The US can use this window to restore and even strengthen its overall warfighting capabilities and overall national competitiveness. China, on the other hand, is thus placed on a strategic defensive position. It cannot be ruled out that China may forever lose the historical opportunity to grow into a dominant empire.

Ye Qiquan harshly criticizes the greed, shortsightedness, and stupidity of Hong Kong people. The article cites evidence from multiple sources to prove that the central government is unlikely to grant Hong Kong people the right to “universal suffrage” or “genuine universal suffrage.” Doing so would be tantamount to handing over Hong Kong’s ownership to a group of people completely lacking in political understanding. It would also be equivalent to handing Hong Kong back to the British again, without compensation and completely. Ye Qiquan predicts that the Chinese central government is not only unlikely to agree to grant Hong Kong people more power, but on the contrary, it will have to reclaim some of the powers previously granted to Hong Kong people. Furthermore, if Hong Kong people maintain their inertia of confrontation with the central government, it will seriously affect Hong Kong’s political prospects after 2047.

Ye Qiquan believes that the establishment and maintenance of the Israeli state depend on four pillars: geostrategic needs; geostrategic values; the overall competitiveness of the nation or state; and philosophical values. Perhaps in a new era, all four pillars may face challenges.

China’s “July 1st mechanism” is an unstable power order. It is clearly the result of a brutal power struggle among multiple political forces. Within the Chinese military, there may be reasons related to insufficient political ability, resources, or operational skills among military leaders. For Xi Jinping’s side, the surprise attack was the fundamental and direct cause of losing ultimate political decision-making power in China. However, they retained their complete “traditional” power and full administrative authority. This outcome may be the result of a desperate resistance from the core members of Xi Jinping’s group. More likely, it is the result of manipulation behind the scenes by powerful political families in China. For Hu Jintao’s political group and Hu Chunhua, they may be the actual leaders of the “July 1st mechanism,” or they may be a temporary staged performance group. Other powerful political families in China will not sit idly by while weaker political groups seize supreme power. They have the ability to choose a favorable opportunity. They can both escape the “historical responsibility for illegal actions” and manipulate the composition of the next power center in China.