Table of Contents: Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis V1 (2); April 2026

By叶 其泉

This is the most comprehensive and in-depth collection of documents to date studying China’s “July 1st Mechanism.” China will issue a notice on July 1, 2025, announcing the establishment of a “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body.” This is essentially a notice of a transfer of power execution procedures in China. From this day forward, the execution procedures of China’s highest power will enter a new system. The final decision-making power in this new system has been transferred from the Xi Jinping group to the “Central Committee Decision-Making and Coordination Body” created by the “July 1st Mechanism.” However, the construction of this power mechanism has structural flaws. These structural flaws mean that none of the three parties involved are completely victorious or completely defeated. None of them are completely victorious or completely defeated. The possibility of one party suddenly being completely resurrected or another suddenly being completely defeated cannot be ruled out.

The articles in Volume 1, Issue 2 of *Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis* all revolve around the theme of China. These include: an interpretation of the background of China’s domestic political turmoil; the dilemmas faced by the three political forces deeply embroiled in political instability in China; and concepts related to China’s imperial construction process.

This issue analyzes from a unique perspective that the three main political forces in China are currently in dire straits. Xi Jinping leads the ruling forces in China. They still hold onto the traditional power structure (Auctoritas Caelestis), which is the foundation for their self-preservation and even complete rebirth. If they cannot achieve this rebirth by February 2027, they will peacefully and systematically enter their predetermined end: a quiet death awaiting political judgment. Some will enter the next leadership group, most will exit peacefully, and some will suffer severe political punishment. In particular, Xi Jinping and his family, his wife’s family, and his mother’s family will suffer severe political retaliation.

The Chinese military was originally the direct force behind the dramatic domestic unrest expected in 2025. However, after Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were isolated from the military in January 2026, the Chinese military entered a period of silence. This does not mean the Chinese military has completely lost its capabilities. They remain independent of the Xi Jinping faction. If the Xi Jinping faction cannot be fully revitalized by February 2027, the military leaders are safe. However, the risk of them facing sudden political death cannot be ruled out.

The true leaders of China’s extra-mandate political forces are currently unclear. A July 1, 2025 announcement formally declared them the true power structure in China. If they can successfully prevent the Xi Jinping regime from fully re-emerging by February 2027, they could smoothly lead the formation of China’s 21st power group. However, this force clearly retains elements of Hu Jintao’s style. The weakness of its leaders could undermine their overall capabilities. Given Xi Jinping’s exceptional political abilities, the current leaders of China’s extra-mandate political forces also face the risk of sudden political demise.

Other noteworthy points include the extensive advertising in this issue. These include: the risks of Israel’s national and ethnic strategies; the risks the United States faces from China; the background of major powers’ policies toward Iran; potential pathways for Japan to shed its historical guilt and rise to regional leadership; possible extreme governance schemes after China’s unification of Taiwan; China’s policy toward Europe during the unification process; the political system and administrative changes in Hong Kong after 2047; and how Russia is thinking about its border policies.

Purchase link:  https://bookstore.pppnet.net/en/downloads/en-toc-2026v1n2/

0- Political Forecasting and In-Depth Analysis, Volume 1, Issue 2, Table of Contents

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