(Chinese) divine power summoning device in Taiwan

China’s “July 1st mechanism” is an unstable power order. It is clearly the result of a brutal power struggle among multiple political forces. Within the Chinese military, there may be reasons related to insufficient political ability, resources, or operational skills among military leaders. For Xi Jinping’s side, the surprise attack was the fundamental and direct cause of losing ultimate political decision-making power in China. However, they retained their complete “traditional” power and full administrative authority. This outcome may be the result of a desperate resistance from the core members of Xi Jinping’s group. More likely, it is the result of manipulation behind the scenes by powerful political families in China. For Hu Jintao’s political group and Hu Chunhua, they may be the actual leaders of the “July 1st mechanism,” or they may be a temporary staged performance group. Other powerful political families in China will not sit idly by while weaker political groups seize supreme power. They have the ability to choose a favorable opportunity. They can both escape the “historical responsibility for illegal actions” and manipulate the composition of the next power center in China.

The imperial path is the only way to solve China’s practical problems, especially those based on economics, costs, normal profit returns, giving back to the people, reducing public resentment, resisting external plunder, and resisting the oppressive order. Before establishing a power skeleton (the outward framework of an empire), any “shortcut” is unsustainable and unsustainable. This is because the power to set rules is in the hands of others; the strongest capital forces do not support you (capital must be parasitic within a power framework, with politics and capital coexisting as a dual authority); economic adjudication power is in the hands of others. You may work hard for 10 years, but someone can easily steal your profits by changing the rules. With a little instigation, outsiders can plunder your interests. With a little provocation, your former friends can demand exorbitant prices. If you try to govern with finance, capital will inevitably strip you of your independent decision-making power. If you try to introduce easily controllable, scattered foreign capital, it will inevitably affect your organizational capabilities and domestic stability. If you only cultivate the imperial core with “internal friction costs,” the imperial core cannot develop in the long term and will inevitably shrink. Without the “empire’s external framework” to support the “empire’s core,” the empire’s core cannot be maintained properly.

This is the preface and table of contents for the inaugural issue of the quarterly journal *Political Forecasting and In-Depth Studies*. The reason for including a “Review of the Hong Kong Issue” in the inaugural issue is to demonstrate a point by reviewing political predictions that have been proven by history: that is, given the right perspective and analytical methods, an individual’s power can overcome a powerful state apparatus—including superpowers like the United States and the United Kingdom.

A war has effectively divided Russia into the “new political power bloc.” A “political buffer zone” is effectively established, isolating Russia from the development process of Europe. Europe established this buffer zone not only with the immediate goal of weakening Russia, but also with the expectation that it will bring more historical benefits. Moving this buffer zone to a geographical location most favorable to Russia’s long-term national interests will be a long-term national pursuit for Russia. This goal may take 100 years to achieve, or it may be accelerated. Russia and China have a long history of complexities, geopolitical complexities, and significant differences in cultural characteristics. These factors make the two countries wary of each other, hinder each other, and pay corresponding real and historical costs. However, the development priorities and expansion goals of the two countries in the next 100 years will not have major conflicts, which is a historical window for the two countries to cooperate deeply. Encouraging the leaders of the two countries to recognize this background will be the foundation for improving their cooperation, reducing the historical costs for both countries, and accelerating the growth of the “new political power bloc.” This is a difficult but extremely valuable task. After ensuring that Russia has established a secure national border in a favorable position, seeking a comprehensive reconciliation with Europe is also a solution that is in line with Russia’s long-term national interests. Furthermore, although the probability of this happening is extremely low, there is a theoretical possibility that the United States would seek cooperation with Russia to jointly address the challenge posed by China. Compared to cooperation with China, a cooperative approach between Russia and Europe/the United States is more in line with Russian cultural trends, philosophical logic, identity politics, and communication habits.

A political assumption is that the old imperial order, dominated by the United States, relied on four main pillars of power: the North American pillar, the European pillar, the East Asian pillar, and the Israeli pillar. In China’s construction of its imperial structure, the East Asian pillar of the United States is the first to be impacted. The United States must first assess this reality and formulate the best response plan. China has reached a historical juncture in building its imperial structure. Closing its security gaps in the East is crucial to the speed and success of its imperial construction. Its focus is not only on East Asia but also inevitably includes the security of Southeast Asia, the Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean passage. The competition between these two established players and newcomers dominates the process of building a new order in East Asia. However, Russia is not inactive. It may become a key third party, reaping significant unexpected gains in balancing European actions.

Based on China’s July 1, 2025 announcement mechanism, it can be determined that the Xi Jinping faction is currently the weaker party. The Chinese military is currently the main force stabilizing China’s political situation; however, the military and its leaders have serious deficiencies. Overall, China’s extra-mandate political force is currently the strongest party and holds a general advantage. However, these advantages do not guarantee their complete victory. None of the three parties is currently completely defeated, nor can any party guarantee victory. They all need to find a way out of their predicament.