A Japanese Perspective on the “New World Order”
Ye Qiquan (qiquanye@gmail.com) ORCID: 0000-0002-4286-9746 Sunday, October 26, 2025
summary:
Finding the right path is crucial to Japan’s historical future. In the impending period of “chaos before the start of a new order,” Japan will face enormous risks, but also the potential to seize opportunities. Thorough prior research and the development of comprehensive, multi-dimensional action plans can provide the right guidance for Japan’s choices at critical moments. The new East Asian order is a historical trend, but it is not yet fixed. Japan’s focus should be on in-depth research to steer events in a direction that benefits Japan’s long-term interests.
Discussion and Summary
In the impending “chaotic period before the start of the new order,” Japan has “virtually no initiative in political choices.” Japan cannot influence the direction and process of building a new order in East Asia. In the early stages, Japan, along with South Korea, is an inevitable member of the US alliance. “Japan cannot make any strategically valuable contribution at this stage.” Japan has no need to actively promote any process. In Ye Qiquan’s theoretical assumption, once the military conflict between the US alliance and the China alliance escalates to a medium-level hot war or higher, the US alliance will inevitably move its main military forces towards the Philippines to escape the coverage area of China’s short- and medium-range missiles. This major military mobilization will inevitably provide Japan and South Korea with an opportunity for political autonomy.
In Ye Qiquan’s discussion of the options for the United States to respond to China’s unification of Taiwan, these can be divided into two main groups: pre-emptive response plans and post-emptive response plans. Alternatively, they can be categorized by function into eight toolkits: “delaying tactics,” “peace talks,” and “confrontation.” Within each toolkit, the confrontational approach fails to guarantee the advantage of the US alliance. The main arguments are as follows.
The inability of the US-led coalition to land on Chinese territory means that the US-led coalition cannot completely defeat China at the national level.
The China -US alliance leads the US alliance in the “effective range” of both strategic and tactical weapons. Ye Qiquan believes that each technological era has different dominant battlefield weapons. Equipment assuming the role of dominant battlefield weapons must be superior in three fundamental characteristics: “range (kill distance),” “damage effect,” and “economic efficiency (capability for large-scale deployment).” Compared to the US, the economic advantage of Chinese weapons is undeniable.
In terms of range, Chinese weapons also have a comparative advantage.
In terms of destructive effect, land-based weapons naturally have a greater advantage than sea-based weapons. Simultaneous air-to-ground launches of 2-4 medium-range missiles can ensure the creation of an effective kill zone of approximately 9 square kilometers at sea. Correspondingly, the area of land-based facilities susceptible to effective damage decreases exponentially.
Faced with China ‘s defensive-offensive strategy, the US-led coalition has no chance of winning. China can implement its “defensive-offensive strategy” within the coverage area of its medium-range missiles. That is, China has the initiative to choose the battlefield in East Asia. The US-led coalition has no certainty of victory against China’s defensive strategy. Even if Europe as a whole joins the East Asian theater, it cannot change this trend.
The structure of the US-led alliance is no more stable than that of the Chinese alliance. Europe has effectively been expelled from the US imperial power leadership group since 2022 and has become a de facto US tax haven. Europe will not be able to end its state of war with Russia until at least the end of 2026, and this state of war may even continue until the end of 2029. During this period, China effectively holds the political initiative over Europe. If Europe attempts to become a base for a war of attrition waged by the US-led alliance, China will inevitably instigate chaos in central Europe to thwart this effort.
From South Korea’s perspective, if the United States’ war-fighting capabilities begin to weaken, South Korea will be unable to cope alone with the military and political pressure from North Korea, Russia, or China. If the conflict between the US and China escalates to a medium-level hot war, South Korea’s withdrawal from the conflict process will be inevitable. Once South Korea withdraws, Japan will undoubtedly follow suit.
Japan’s war prospects are bleak, and its political prospects are even more perilous. If the East Asian war escalates to a medium- or high-level hot war, Japan’s war prospects are extremely bleak. Its political prospects are even bleaker. Therefore, it is essential for Japan to develop various contingency plans in advance; the prediction and response to the nation’s future are crucial.
Japan has not completely lost its opportunities. The escalating political tensions in East Asia stem primarily from two significant events: Japan’s nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands in 2012 and South Korea’s deployment of THAAD in 2016. In fact, Chinese politicians do not believe these two egregious events were driven by the inner impulses of Japan and South Korea. However, political animosity towards Japan and South Korea among the Chinese public cannot be eradicated. This political hostility is intensifying. However, Japan is not without opportunities to ease tensions with the Chinese public. If Japan seizes crucial moments, and with the guidance of politicians from both sides, there is a chance to mitigate the animosity towards Japan among the Chinese public. Japan should conduct in-depth research, develop contingency plans, and provide support for shifting public opinion in this direction.
A new East Asian order may be beneficial to Japan’s long-term interests. There is no definitive solution for the new East Asian order; at least four scenarios and six possible outcomes are possible. Japan’s focus should be on conducting in-depth research beforehand and guiding events in a direction that benefits Japan’s long-term interests.
(All statistics are from publicly available data prior to April 2022)
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